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THE CHANGES TO THE PUBLIC CONTRACT DIRECTIVESAND
THE STORYTHEY TELLABOUT HOW EU LAW WORKS
ROBERTO CARANTA*
Abstract
The new rules for public procurements and concessions were published
early in 2014.The reform process laid bare the different preferences of and
the consequent tensions among the different actors of legislation. The
result are provisions which are innovative in many respects, even where
the rationale of the law is the same, but also very complex, and at times
obscure, making this area even more technical that it already was. This
paper gives an introduction to the most relevant novelties in the law, at the
same time, it highlights and discusses a number of issues in the law
making process and problematic areas in the substantive rules enacted.
The article aims not to describe all the new provisions in detail, but to
analyse rather closely specific aspects in order to help understand, and
interpret, EU public contract law.
1. Introduction
The public contracts reform package proposed by the Commission in 2011
was finally approved early in 2014. Three new instruments were enacted:
Directive 2014/23/EU on concession contracts, Directive 2014/24/EU on
public sector procurement, and Directive 2014/25/EU on procurements in the
utilities sectors.1 The directives lay down the rules which will apply to public
contracts passed by the covered authorities and entities in the Member States.
These are huge documents. Taken together, the three directives spread through
374 pages of the Official Journal of the EU. The text of Directive 2014/24
* University of Turin. I thank Carina Risvig Hamer, Albert Sanchez Graells, Sarah
Schoenmaekers and Abby Semple for their remarks on a first draft of this article. For the same
reasons, thanks to Zhou Fen, who also helped me tame the footnotes. I am solely responsible for
mistakes.
1. Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts, O.J. 2014, L 94/1–64;
Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement, O.J. 2014, L/65–242; and Directive 2014/25/EU,
on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors,
O.J. 2014, L 94/243–374. The highlights of the proposals were analysed by Ølykke, Risvig and
Tvarnø (Eds.), EU Procurement Directives: Modernization, Growth & Innovation (DJØF,
2012).
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alone, the longest one, runs for 79 pages, with 138 recitals and 94 articles. Its
annexes take close to 100 additional pages. It is impossible here to go through
all the changes in the regulatory environment of public contracts brought
about by these massive pieces of legislation.2
The focus of this article will first be on the reasons of the reform, and the
analysis will also provide the opportunity to shed light on some substantive
changes in the regulatory framework.3 The directives repealed by the present
package date from 2004. In terms of public contract law, this decade feels
rather like centuries. What is in fact the same rationale for EU secondary law
in this area has evolved if not changed.4 Technical innovation is providing new
opportunities to cut costs while integrity in contract procedures has come into
the spotlight.
This leads to a second lens through which the new legislative package is
analysed. The reform process highlighted the different preferences and the
ensuing tensions among the various makers of EU law: EU institutions but
also the Member States. The institutional dynamics of EU law-making
matters, and while looking at it some of the most relevant novelties brought
about by the new directives will be examined as well.
The analysis will then go deeper into the details, highlighting some of the
most relevant changes brought about by the new directives, especially
focusing on the scope of their application and on the award procedures. A
change in the regulatory preferences has affected the latter, while a large crop
of cases has clarified a range of issues – but created uncertainty on a few, so
that codification was necessary.5
A conclusion will follow to assess how the institutional dynamic at play has
shaped the legislation to a considerable extent, impacting on its quality or at
least on its suitability to attain some of the initial objective of the reform
exercise such as flexibility and simplification. Finally, a few ideas about what
needs to be done will be explained.
2. The most significant novelties are analysed in the works collected by Lichère, Caranta
and Treumer (Eds.),Modernising Public Procurement: The New Directive (DJØF, 2014).
3. A very good starting point is Treumer, “Evolution of the EU public procurement regime”
in Lichère, Caranta and Treumer, op. cit. supra note 2, 9 et seq.
4. The rationale of the public procurement rules was dissected by the contributions
collected at the initiative of the Swedish Competition Authority (SCA) in SCA (Ed.) The Cost
of Different Goals of Public Procurement (Västerås, 2012).
5. The reasons for the development of the case law are analysed by Bovis, “Developing
public procurement regulation: Jurisprudence and its influence on law making”, 49 CML Rev.
(2012), 461–495; Drijber and Stergiou, “Public procurement law and internal market law”, 46
CML Rev. (2009), 805–846.
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2. The reasons for the reform
The 2004 EU public procurement law package was made up of two directives.
Directive 2004/17/EC regulated public procurement in the utilities sectors
(water, energy, transport and postal services).6 In a number of Member States
these sectors are characterized by a mix of public and private involvement,
which means that public procurement rules still apply, but somewhat more
flexibly than those applicable in the fully public sector.7 Directive
2004/18/EC, the so-called classic or public sector directive, codified the rules
applicable to works, supplies and services procurements and to works
concessions, which had previously been dispersed in three different directives.
The 2004 directives had to be implemented in the Member States by 31
January 2006 at the latest. Directive 2007/66/EC amending the existing
directives on remedies8 and Directive 2009/81/EC on procurements in the
fields of defence and security were adopted later.9
The Commission was hardly done with these pieces of legislation, when it
started work on a new reform package of the 2004 directives.10 In early 2011,
it published the Green paper on The modernization of EU public procurement
policy, Towards a more efficient European Procurement Market – setting out
a number of questions which were opened to the consultation with
stakeholders and civil society at large.11 A prior consultation had also been
held on an EU initiative on concessions; this case was not open to the public,
though, but specifically addressed to three groups of stakeholders with an
interest in concessions: the business community, contracting authorities and
the social partners.12
6. A complete history of the evolution of EU law in this area is provided by Arrowsmith,
The Law of Public andUtilities Procurement, 3rd ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 2014), at p. 182 et seq.
7. See Torricelli, “Utilities procurement’ in Trybus, Caranta and Edelstam (Eds.), EU
Public Contract Law (Bruylant, 2014), at p. 223.
8. See Bovis, “Remedies” in Trybus, Caranta and Edelstam, op. cit. supra note 7, at 368 et
seq., and, also for the implementation of the remedies directives in selected Member States,
Treumer and Lichère (Eds.), Enforcement of the EU Public Procurement Rules (DJØF 2011).
9. The book of reference is Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe (Cambridge
University Press, 2014).
10. An initiative in this area was announced in the Communication Towards a Single
Market Act – For a highly competitive social market economy, COM(2010)608. Work on
legislation in the area of concessions started even earlier: see Burnett, “The new European
Directive on the award of concession contracts – promoting value for money in PPP contracts?”,
(2014) European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review (EPPPL), 86–103.
11. COM(2011)15 final.
12. The initiative was also supported by three earlier studies commissioned from academia
(College d’Europe) and consultant firms (CSES and Pricewaterhouse Cooper). The materials
are also available at: <ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/modernising_ru
les/consultations/index_en.htm> (last visited 28 Nov. 2014); a quite critical comment was
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The difficult economic and social situation following the financial crises
which had started in the US and swept through much of the world, Europe
included, was what prompted the Commission into action. The
above-mentioned Green paper states that “Obtaining optimal procurement
outcomes through efficient procedures is of crucial importance in the context
of the severe budgetary constraints and economic difficulties in many EU
Member States”.13 The Green paper begins with a reference to the Europe
2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.14 Public
procurement is said to play a key role in this by a) improving framework
conditions for business to innovate, making full use of demand-side policy; b)
supporting the shift towards a resource-efficient and low-carbon economy, for
instance “by encouraging wider use of green public procurement”, and finally
c) improving the business environment, especially for innovative SMEs.15
Immediately thereafter, the Green paper recalls that the Europe 2020 strategy
also stresses that public procurement policy “must ensure the most efficient
use of public funds and that procurement markets must be kept open EU
wide”. Late in 2011 the Commission tabled the three reform proposals which,
with substantial changes, were approved by the European Parliament and the
Council and entered into force in 2014.16
2.1. Quest for a legal basis
The objectives pursued by secondary legislation have a particular relevance in
EU law, since they link to the issue of which legal basis allows the EU
institutions to act and to the question of competence. The public procurement
directives have always been based on the Treaty’s internal market provisions
on free movement.17 The ECJ has often repeated that the principal objective of
the (then) Community rules in the field of public procurement is “the free
penned by Kotsonis, “Green paper on the modernisation of EU procurement policy: Towards a
more efficient European procurement market”, 20 Public Procurement Law Review (PPLR)
(2011), NA51. 51–58.
13. COM(2011)15 final, at p. 3.
14. COM(2010)2020.
15. See Trybus, “The promotion of small and medium sized enterprises in public
procurement: A strategic objective of the new public sector Directive?” in Lichère, Caranta and
Treumer, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 256 et seq.
16. The proposals were published as COM(2011)895, 896 and 893 final.
17. Comba, “Variations in the scope of the new EU public procurement Directives of 2014”
in Lichère, Caranta and Treumer, op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 30 et seq; Trybus, “Public contracts
in European Union internal market law: Foundations and requirements” in Noguellou and
Stelkens (Eds.), Droit comparé des Contrats Publics – Comparative Law on Public Contracts
(Bruylant, 2010), at p. 85 et seq; Arrowsmith, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 164 et seq.
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movement of services and the opening-up to undistorted competition in all the
Member States”.18
The preamble to Directive 2014/24 too recalls Article 53(1), Article 62 and
Article 114 TFEU. The traditional rationale for the EU regulation of public
contracts passed in the Member States is also repeated in Recital 1 of the new
Public Sector Directive.19 While the award of all public contracts has to
comply with the principles of the TFEU, for public contracts above a certain
value, provisions must be drawn up coordinating national procurement
procedures so as to ensure that those principles are given practical effect and
public procurement is opened up to competition.20
Directive 2014/23 is firmly grounded in internal market considerations,21
just updated with a fashionable reference to SMEs – which could be somewhat
at odds with the particularly high thresholds set in Article 8 (over EUR 5
million).22 What is peculiar to the concessions Directive is that the light
regulatory approach is explained with reference to the subsidiarity principle
and Article 5 TFEU.23
The reform has however made the definition of the rationale for EU public
contract rules more complex.24 The 2011 Green paper appears to have
challenged the internal market rationale of EU public contract legislation.25
The necessity to keep the EU wide market open is recalled almost as an
afterthought: in the face of challenging times, “there is a greater need than
ever for a functioning and efficient European Procurement Market”.26 The
idea that moved the Commission to present a reform package was to simplify
and update the European public procurement legislation “so as to make the
award of contracts more flexible and enable public contracts to be put to better
use in support of other policies”.27
18. E.g. Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau, EU:C:2005:5, para 44; see also for
further references, Drijber and Stergiou, op. cit. supra note 5, at 804.
19. See also Rec. 2 of Dir. 2014/25.
20. Rec. 1 of Dir. 2014/24.
21. See, based on the proposal, Sanchez-Graells, “What need and logic for a new Directive
on concessions, particularly regarding the issue of their economic balance?”, (2012) EPPPL,
94–109, at 98 and 103.
22. See Rec. 1 of Dir. 2014/23.
23. Ibid. Rec. 78; one could well make the point that the principle in question should also
apply with reference to the other directives: Arrowsmith, “Modernising the European Union’s
public procurement regime: A blueprint for real simplicity and flexibility”, 21 PPLR (2012),
at 72.
24. For a general discussion: Arrowsmith “Understanding the purpose of the EU’s
procurement directives: the limited role of the EU regime and some proposals for reform” in
The Cost of Different Goals…, cited supra note 4, p. 44.
25. See critically Kotsonis, op. cit. supra note 12, at NA 56 et seq.
26. COM(2011)15 final, at p. 3.
27. Ibid.; on flexibility see the assessment by Treumer, op. cit. supra note 3, 9 et seq.
Public Contract Law 395
The same Green paper sketches a historical evolution of sorts.28 This moves
from the directives enacted up to that point, whose principal aim had been “to
ensure that economic operators benefit fully from the basic freedoms in the
field of public procurement”, to mention of “a number of objectives relating to
the integration of other policies in this framework, such as protection of the
environment and social standards or the fight against corruption”. The
proposal aims at modernizing public procurement tools and methods “to make
them better suited to deal with the evolving political, social and economic
context” and more notably to achieving a number of complementary
objectives. The first objective is to increase the efficiency of public spending.
Another complementary objective is to allow procurers to make better use of
public procurement in support of common societal goals. Collaterally, EU
public procurement law could also help prevent and fight corruption and
favouritism and improve the access of European undertakings to third country
markets.29
The preamble to Directive 2014/24 starts with a reference to the TFEU and
in particular to the internal market provisions found in Articles 53(1), 62 and
114 thereof. Recital 2 of Directive 2014/24, however, draws heavily on the
Green paper, referring to the Europe 2020 strategy and mentioning twice the
efficient spending of public funds.30 The possibility of “a general genetic
modification of the procurement Directives” has even been advanced.31 It is
here however submitted that not all the considerations listed in Recital 2
qualify as legal bases for secondary legislation within the competences of the
EU and meeting the requirements of Article 5 TEU.32
2.2. Green procurement
Under Article 4(2) TFEU, the Union and the Member States have shared
competence in areas such as the internal market, the environment and social
policy (but the latter only for aspects defined by the Treaty). Moreover, under
Article 6 the Union may take supporting measures inter alia in the field of
industry. According to the principle of consistency laid down in Article 7
TFEU, EU institutions must take all of the treaties’ objectives into account
when adopting measures falling within their competences. It is therefore
28. But see the historical account by Comba, op. cit. supra note 17, at 30 et seq.
29. COM(2011)15 final, at p. 3.
30. See also Rec. 47 of Dir. 2014/24; Rec. 3 of Dir. 2014/23 and Rec. 4 of Dir. 2014/25 also
refers to the Europe 2020 strategy; see the discussion in Comba, op. cit. supra note 17, 38 et seq.
31. Comba, op. cit. supra note 17, at 41.
32. Arrowsmith, op. cit. supra note 23, at 72 and her previous works referred therein, and
Boyle, “EU procurement green paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy: a
personal response”, 20 PPLR (2011), NA171 et seq.
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legitimate and makes sense when enacting rules on public contracts based on
the internal market provisions of the TFEU to address issues of sustainable
procurement and more specifically green procurement.33 This even more so
since, under Article 11, environmental protection requirements must be
integrated into the definition and implementation of the EU’s policies and
activities, “in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development”.34
The new directives have gone a long way in empowering contracting
authorities to engage in sustainable procurement and more specifically in
green procurement, to a certain extent lowering the regulatory risks attached
to this approach under the 2004 directives. As has been remarked, the
“sustainability paradigm is almost taking over the realm of public
procurement, and it is marketed as a major ‘selling point’ of the new
legislation”.35
The most relevant innovation is possibly the codification of life cycle
costing analysis or methodologies.36 Beside a margin of profit, the cost of any
good or service is given by the sum of the costs incurred in producing the good
or service at issue. Public procurement practice and law were of course aware
of further costs ultimately borne by the contracting authority, such as for
instance running costs, cost-effectiveness, after-sales service and technical
assistance.37 Where the uncertainties arose was in how to deal with
externalities – and particularly environmental externalities such as pollution –
in both the production, use and decommissioning phases of the life cycle of a
good or service.38
It is true that Article 53 of Directive 2004/18/EC had to a large extent
codified the Concordia Bus39 case law, which had permitted reference to
green award criteria, provided that they were linked to the subject matter of
the contract and established in advance in an objective and non-discriminatory
33. See also Rec. 41 of Dir. 2014/24 and Rec. 52 of Dir. 2014/25; also refer to Fisher, “The
power of purchase: Addressing sustainability through public procurement”, 8 EPPPL (2013),
2–7.
34. Art. 11 is referred to by Rec. 91 of Dir. 2014/24; in the rich literature on green
procurement see now Dragos and Neamtu, “Sustainable public procurement in the EU:
experiences and prospects” in Lichère, Caranta and Treumer (Eds.), op. cit. supra note 2, 302
et seq; for reference to the implementation of EU law in a number of Member States please refer
to the works collected by Caranta and Trybus (Eds.), The Law of Green and Social Procurement
in Europe (DJØF, 2010).
35. Dragos and Neamtu, op. cit. supra note 34, at 304.
36. See Semple, A Practical Guide to Public Procurement (Cambridge, 2015 forthcoming),
para 4.43 et seq; Dragos and Neamtu, op. cit. supra note 34, 326 et seq.
37. Art. 53(1)(a) Dir. 2004/18/EC.
38. See Dragos and Neamtu, “Sustainable public procurement: Life Cycle Costing (LCC)
in the new EU Directive proposal”, 8 EPPPL (2013), 19–29.
39. Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus, EU:C:2002:495.
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manner.40 How these requirements had to be met, however, was not always
easy to say. The outcome of the legislative process (analysed below) is that
Directive 2014/24 both provides a working definition of life cycle costing and
lays down award criteria through which contracting authorities (and entities)
may take into account of externalities in their purchasing decisions. Under
Article 2(1)(20) “life cycle” means all consecutive and/or interlinked stages,
including research and development to be carried out, production, trading and
its conditions, transport, use and maintenance, throughout the existence of the
product or the works or the provision of the service, from raw material
acquisition or generation of resources to disposal, clearance and end of service
or utilization.41
Recital 96 further nails down the concept, adding that life cycle costing may
also “include costs imputed to environmental externalities, such as pollution
caused by extraction of the raw materials used in the product or caused by the
product itself or its manufacturing”. The more traditional free trade concerns
resurface in the same recital, which goes on to make clear that these costs may
be included provided that “they can be monetized and monitored”. To this end,
Article 68 of Directive 2014/24 lists the conditions which must be met by life
cycle methodologies. They must be based on objectively verifiable and
non-discriminatory criteria, must be accessible to all interested parties, and
the data required may be provided with reasonable effort by normally diligent
economic operators, including economic operators from third countries party
to the GPA or other international agreements by which the Union is bound.42
One question which was raised in the Green paper was if, and if so to what
extent, EU law should not just empower but actually direct contracting
authorities to purchase environmentally sound goods and services (or at least
provide incentives to do so).43 This is already the case with specific legislation
– such as for instance Regulation 106/2008 (the so-called EU Energy Star
Regulation), which introduced obligations on contracting authorities to
require in their public contracts a certain level of energy efficiency, or
Directive 2009/33/EC on promotion of clean and energy-efficient vehicles –
which introduced obligations on contracting authorities to take energy or other
environmental impacts into account in their public procurement decisions.
40. See Comba, op. cit. supra note 17, at 35.
41. Please refer to Caranta, “Award criteria under EU law (old and new)” in Comba and
Treumer (Eds.), Award of Contracts in EU Procurements (DJØF, 2013), at p. 35 et seq.
42. See Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, at para 4.45 et seq. On the relevance of the GPA in
this context: Tosoni, “The impact of the revised WTO Government Procurement Agreement
on the EU procurement rules from a sustainability perspective”, 8 EPPPL (2013), 41–48.
43. COM(2011)15 final, p. 41 et seq; see the discussion by Trepte, “The contracting
authority as purchaser and regulator: Should the procurement rules regulate what we buy?” in
Ølykke, Risvig and Tvarnø, op. cit. supra note 1, at 85.
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Other measures call on the public sector to play an exemplary role in the field
of energy efficiency (Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency) and by
promoting resource-efficient public buildings for instance due to low or zero
primary energy consumption.44
This time the EU institutions decided not to pursue this course of action
further through sweeping provisions. The important differences between
individual sectors and markets would make it inappropriate to set general
mandatory requirements for environmental, social and innovation
procurement. It was thought better to leave it to sector-specific legislation to
set mandatory objectives and targets, while at the same time promoting the
development and use of European approaches to life cycle costing.45
2.3. Social considerations
While environmental considerations are a well-established – if not
uncontroversial – feature of public contract law and practice, social
considerations occupy a shakier ground.46 This is not because the issue lacks
relevance. Indeed one such condition – providing for the employment of
long-term unemployed – met conditional approval in Beentjes, the first case
on what is now called sustainable procurement.47 The judgment was later
affirmed in an infringement procedure brought against France.48 These cases
did not do much to clarify the conditions under which social considerations
might be taken into account in public procurement. The concern was that such
clauses might be misused to permit “buy national” and “beggar thy
neighbour” policies (in the end, each government, and each level of
government, is rather more worried about the long-term unemployed living
on its own territory than unemployment in general). Instead, they led to some
unnecessary theoretical misconstruction on the part of the Commission.49
Article 9 TFEU, providing that the institutions must also take into account
requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the
guarantee of adequate social protection, and so on, is somewhat weaker than
44. Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources
and Directive 2010/31/EU on the energy performance of buildings. Cf. Rec. 95 of Dir. 2014/24,
see also Rec. 100 of Dir. 2014/25; see Dragos and Neamtu, op. cit. supra note 34, 310 et seq.,
for further references.
45. Rec. 95 of Dir. 2014/24 and Rec. 100 of Dir. 2014/25.
46. See generally Dragos and Neamtu, op. cit. supra note 34.
47. Case 31/87, Beentjes, EU:C:1988:422.
48. Case C-225/98, Commission v. France, EU:C:2000:494; see Arnould, “A turning point
in the use of additional award criteria?”, (2001) PPLR, at NA13; Lambert, “Note” (2001) Act.
Jur. Dr. Adm., 1055.
49. See Caranta, “Sustainable procurement” in Trybus, Caranta, and Edelstam, op. cit.
supra note 7, at p. 164 et seq, and infra section 3.2.
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Article 11, which mandates the integration of environmental protection
requirements into the definition and implementation of the Union’s policies
and activities.50 Article 9 TFEU does, however, seem enough to buttress a
number of provisions in the new directives which pursue social
considerations, together with environmental considerations or on their own.51
One instance of the latter will suffice for now:52 Article 20 of Directive
2014/24 on “Reserved contracts” is based on the consideration that sheltered
workshops and other social businesses whose main aim is to support the social
and professional integration or reintegration of disabled and disadvantaged
persons might not be able to obtain contracts under normal conditions of
competition.53 Consequently, Member States may reserve the right to
participate in public procurement procedures to sheltered workshops and
economic operators whose main aim is the social and professional integration
of disabled or disadvantaged persons. Compared with Article 19 of Directive
2004/18, the legal requirements for reserved contracts have been significantly
relaxed. Under the old Directive this possibility was limited to workshops
employing disabled people, and it was required that at least 50 percent of the
employees of those workshops were disabled. Today, that is 30 percent and
includes workers who are disadvantaged as well as disabled.
One contentious problem concerns compliance with minimum wage
provisions in the award of public contracts. This may take different forms,
concerning for instance foreign workers posted in the Member State of the
contracting authority in order to implement the contract, or workers working
for a sub-contractor in a different Member State. In the first hypothesis,
Directive 96/71 on the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of
services applies. To avoid social dumping – seen as a distortion of the internal
market – the Directive provides that workers temporarily posted abroad enjoy
the same or possibly more generous rights as granted to local workers by rules
of general application. The Directive is not specific to public procurement, but
it was involved in Rüffert, a public procurement case in which a contract was
terminated because a subcontractor employed workers from another EU
country without complying with a collective agreement endorsed at
sub-national level by contracting authorities only.54 The ECJ reasoned in
50. The policy case is another matter, and it was forcefully pleaded by McCrudden, Buying
Social Justice. Equality, Government Procurement & Legal Change (OUP, 2007).
51. See also Rec. 99 of Dir. 2014/24 and Rec. 104 of Dir. 2014/25.
52. But see also Art. 42(1) of Dir. 2014/24, providing that “technical specifications shall,
except in duly justified cases, be drawn up so as to take into account accessibility criteria for
persons with disabilities or design for all users”; see also Rec. 53, 76 and 99, and the Art. 60(1)
of Dir. 2014/25.
53. See Rec. 36 of Dir. 2014/24 and Rec. 51 of Dir. 2014/25.
54. Case C-346/06, Rüffert, EU:C:2008:189.
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classic internal market terms, holding that Directive 96/71 expressly lays
down the degree of protection for posted workers by referring to rules of
general application in the host Member State. These harmonizing measures
seek “in particular to bring about the freedom to provide services, which is one
of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty”.55 On this basis, the
Court inevitably concluded that provisions such as those in the sub-national
legislation at issue could not be justified by the objective of ensuring the
protection of workers or other overriding policy considerations, since the
harmonization measure had already responded to those needs.56
The second hypothesis was at the centre of the more recent
Bundesdruckerei case.57 In a call for tenders for a public contract relating to
the digitalization of documents and the conversion of data, the City of
Dortmund asked tenderers to declare their compliance with local rules
guaranteeing payment of a minimum wage to the employees of
subcontractors. This was challenged by the Bundesdruckerei, which informed
the City of Dortmund that, if it were awarded the contract, the services under
that contract would be performed exclusively in another Member State
(Poland), by a subcontractor established in that State. The ECJ noted that,
unlike in Rüffert, the tenderer did not intend to perform the public contract by
posting, on the German territory, employees of its subcontractor; rather, the
tenderer wanted to subcontract the service to a subcontractor established in
another EU Member State and the employees of the subcontractor were to
carry out the services exclusively in the subcontractor’s home country. On this
basis, the Court held that the imposition, under national legislation, of a
minimum wage on subcontractors of a tenderer which are established in a
Member State other than that to which the contracting authority belongs, and
in which minimum rates of pay are lower, constitutes an additional economic
burden that may prohibit, impede or render less attractive the provision of their
services in the host Member State. Consequently, a measure such as that at
issue in the main proceedings is capable of constituting a restriction within the
meaning of Article 56 TFEU.58
While such a measure might in principle be justified by the objective of
protecting the employees, by ensuring that employees are paid a reasonable
wage in order to avoid both “social dumping” and the penalization of
competing undertakings which grant a reasonable wage to their employees,
55. Ibid., para 36.
56. Ibid., para 38 et seq; see also Arrowsmith and Kunzlik, Public Procurement and
Horizontal Policies in EC law: General Principles (Cambridge University Press, 2009), at p. 7.
57. Case C-549/13, Bundesdruckerei GmbH, EU:C:2014:2235.
58. Ibid., para 30.
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according to the ECJ this cannot be the case here since it applies solely to those
employed by economic operators who have been awarded public contracts
and not to employees generally. In any case, the principle of proportionality is
breached insofar as the scope of the local rules extends to cover a situation in
which employees carry out a public contract in a Member State other than that
to which the contracting authority belongs and in which the minimum wage
rates are possibly lower. Indeed, there is no reason why minimum wages set in
one Member State should apply to workers working in different Member
States, who may experience different conditions, including the cost of
living.59
The objection is obviously that local firms which have to comply with
minimum wages provisions will have a very hard time winning public
contracts. However, as wages have not been harmonized in Europe, they –
together with social benefits, working hours, taxation, energy costs, and so on
– end up being one of the elements in the competition between economic
operators established in different Member States. This does not mean that the
protection offered under Directive 96/71 could not be extended, for instance to
cover rules of particular application, but this should be done, if at all, by
amending the posted workers Directive rather than the public contract ones.
After much debate inside the institutions, with very different drafts being
put on the table, the new public contract Directives leave the issue very much
as it was under the old ones. The recitals of Directive 2014/24 bear witness to
a tension between high-flying social aspirations and the internal market
juggernaut. True, “with a view to the better integration of social and
environmental considerations in the procurement procedures, contracting
authorities should be allowed to use award criteria or contract performance
conditions relating to the works, supplies or services to be provided under the
public contract in any respect and at any stage of their life cycles”.60 However,
award criteria or contract performance conditions concerning social aspects of
the production process should be “applied in accordance with Directive
96/71/EC, as interpreted by the ECJ” and “should not be chosen or applied in
a way that discriminates directly or indirectly against economic operators
from other Member States”. More specifically, “requirements concerning the
basic working conditions regulated in Directive 96/71/EC, such as minimum
rates of pay, should remain at the level set by national legislation or by
collective agreements applied in accordance with Union law in the context of
that Directive”.61 This approach will also be relevant in the interpretation of
Article 70 of Directive 2014/24 on contract performance conditions, whose
59. Ibid., para 36 et seq.
60. Rec. 97 of Dir. 2014/24 and Rec. 102 of Dir. 2014/25.
61. Rec. 98 of Dir. 2014/24; see also Rec. 64 of Dir. 2014/23 and Rec. 103 of Dir. 2014/25.
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text alone could be considered more permissive of social or
employment-related considerations.62
Finally, addressing situations in which the implementation of the contract is
delocalized as compared with the seat of the contracting authority, the recitals
of the directives make it clear that services “should be considered to be
provided at the place where the characteristic performances are executed”.63
This will also apply to supplies, the characteristic performance being
production.64
Linked to social considerations in some way are the measures to the benefit
of SMEs. The reform package has introduced four main “new” regimes for
the promotion of SMEs: the division of contracts into lots, the European
Single Procurement Document, the limitation of participation requirements,
and direct payments to subcontractors.65
2.4. The efficiency of public spending
The efficiency of public spending does not relate to any of the competences
the Treaties bestow on the EU institutions,66 even if they refer more and more
to it in order to make EU rules on public contracts more palatable – or less
indigestable – for the Member States.67
The ECJ case law does not support enlisting best value for money among
the objectives of EU public contracts law either.68 This contention requires a
careful reading of more recent judgments, which admittedly are more nuanced
as to a plurality of objectives being satisfied by EU secondary law on the
award of public contracts. InManova, the Court uses the plural to reiterate that
“[o]ne of the principal objectives of the public procurement rules under EU
law is to ensure the free movement of services and the opening up of
undistorted competition in all the Member States”.69 Objectives (plural) may
well include strategic ones – but not, it is submitted, best value for money.True
in CoNISMa and more recently in Swm Costruzioni 2 the ECJ held that the
62. See to this effect Rec. 65 of Dir. 2014/23 and Rec. 98 of Dir. 2014/24 and Rec. 103 of
Dir. 2014/25; the issue is to resurface in Case C-115/14, RegioPost, pending before the ECJ.
63. Rec. 56 of Dir. 2014/23; Rec. 38 of Dir. 2014/24; Rec. 53 of Dir. 2014/25; all of them
refer to the instance of call centres.
64. Reference to compliance “in substance” with fundamental International Labour
Organization (ILO) Conventions was made, not without much debate among the institutions,
Rec. 98 of Dir. 2014/24; see also Rec. 65 of Dir. 2014/23 and Rec. 103 of Dir. 2014/25.
65. See Trybus, op. cit. supra note 15, esp. 262 et seq.
66. See Arrowsmith and Kunzlik, op. cit. supra note 56, at 30 et seq., and the discussion of
their opinion in Comba, op. cit. supra note 17, at 41 et seq.
67. For early instances see Comba, op. cit. supra note 17, at 33 and 38 et seq.
68. See also the analysis by Arrowsmith, op. cit. supra note 24, at 84 et seq.
69. Case C-336/12,Manova, EU:C:2013:647, para 28.
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objective of attaining the widest possible opening-up of public contracts to
competition benefits not only economic operators but also contracting
authorities.70 In particular, in CoNISMa the ECJ added that “the widest
possible opening-up to competition is contemplated not only from the point of
view of the Community interest in the free movement of goods and services
but also the interest of the contracting authority concerned itself, which will
thus have greater choice as to the most advantageous tender which is most
suitable for the needs of the public authority in question.”71
To this effect, the ECJ referred to SECAP.72 That case answered the
question whether the fundamental principles of EU law oppose a domestic
rule applicable to contracts below the threshold obliging contracting
authorities to exclude tenders considered to be abnormally low without
allowing them any chance of verifying the constituent elements of those
tenders by requesting the tenderers concerned to provide details of those
elements. The Court affirmed the applicability of the fundamental rules of the
(then) EC Treaty and the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of
nationality to below the threshold contracts of certain cross-border interest.73
On this basis, the Court went on to find that domestic rules such as those at
issue, although objective and not in themselves discriminatory, could
undermine the general principle of non-discrimination because in practice
they place at a disadvantage operators from other Member States who might
be in a position to make a bid that is competitive and at the same time genuine
and viable.74 In addition, such legislation could give rise to anti-competitive
conduct and agreements, namely collusion between national or local
undertakings intended to secure public works contracts for themselves, thus
further disadvantaging economic operators from other Member States.75
Having effectively decided the case, the ECJ added that:
“It is also contrary to the contracting authorities’ own interests for them to
be deprived of any power to assess the soundness and viability of
abnormally low tenders, since they are not able to assess tenders which are
submitted to them under conditions of effective competition and therefore
70. Case C-305/08,CoNISMa, EU:C:2009:807, para 37; Case C-94/12, SwmCostruzioni 2,
EU:C:2013:646, para 34.
71. Case C-305/08, CoNISMa, para 37; in Case C-94/12, Swm Costruzioni 2, para 34, the
Court concurred with the Advocate General in listing facilitating the involvement of SMEs in
the contracts procurement market among the aims pursued by Dir. 2004/18/EC.
72. Joined Cases C-147 & 148/06, SECAP and Santorso, EU:C:2008:277.
73. Ibid., para 20 and operative part; on the notion of cross border interest see Risvig
Hansen, Contracts not covered or not fully covered by the Public Sector Directive, (DJØF,
2012), p. 121 et seq; Drijber and Stergiou, op. cit. supra note 5, at 811 et seq.
74. Joined Cases C-147 & 148/06, SECAP and Santorso, para 26.
75. Ibid., para 27.
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to award the contract by applying the criteria, which are also laid down in
the public interest, of the lowest price or the most economically
advantageous tender.”76
The reference to best value for money was clearly obiter here. From the point
of view of EU law, best value for money can indeed be a side effect of the rules
enacted to foster EU-wide competition in the award of public contracts.77 It is
the latter, however, and not best value for money, that is one of the main
objectives of EU secondary law in this area. As it is often the case in EU law,
the obiter has been repeated in later judgments, without however ever
becoming the ratio decidendi of any of them.78
In describing the former objective (i.e. to increase the efficiency of public
spending) the Green paper indicates that: “This includes on the one hand, the
search for best possible procurement outcomes (best value for money). To
reach this aim, it is vital to generate the strongest possible competition for
public contracts awarded in the internal market. Bidders must be given the
opportunity to compete on a level-playing field and distortions of competition
must be avoided.”
It is actually the other way round. The aim is competition in the internal
market. Best value for money is one possible side-benefit.79 “Possible”
because it has been argued that the procedures laid down in the directives,
traditionally limiting the possibility to negotiate with tenderers, actually
hinder contracting authorities aiming at the best possible economic
outcome.80
The reference to the efficiency of public spending seems, in the end, one
element of a marketing exercise to make Brussels rules more palatable to
domestic audiences. This in itself is rather inoffensive and unproblematic.81
No specific provision indeed seems to be justified on the efficiency of public
spending alone. Problems would however arise if efficiency of public
spending was to be taken too seriously, starting to question the need for EU
76. Ibid., para 29.
77. See Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, at para 6.1. et seq., and Burnett, op. cit. supra note
10, at 1 and 7 et seq; see also the discussion on best value for money by Arrowsmith, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 17 et seq.
78. See again CoNISMa, para 37; Case C-94/12, Swm Costruzioni 2, para 34.
79. See also the Opinion of A.G. Jacobs in Case C-19/00 SIAC, EU:C:2001:266, para 33.
80. Arrowsmith, op. cit. supra note 6, at 226 et seq; see also the appraisal by Treumer,
“Flexible procedures or ban on negotiations? Will more negotiation limit the access to the
procurement market?” in Ølykke, Risvig and Tvarnø, op. cit. supra note 1, at 135 et seq., and
the economic analysis in Spagnolo, “Public procurement as a policy tool” in The Cost of
Different Goals…, cited supra note 4, at 25 et seq.
81. But it might point to the need for a restrictive interpretation of some provisions: cf.
Comba, op. cit. supra note 17, at 48.
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rules imposing complex and lengthy procedures to the award of contracts,
most of which are only contended at domestic level.82
2.5. Innovation
Smart growth again is at the very core of the Europe 2020 Strategy. As Recital
47 of Directive 2014/24 recalls, research and innovation, including
eco-innovation and social innovation, are among the main drivers of future
growth. Fostering innovation is therefore one of the objectives of the reform.83
The linkage between public procurement and innovation is legitimate under
Article 6 TFEU read together with Article 7 laying down the principle of
consistency, which allows the Union to take supporting measures in the field
of industry.
Public procurement rules are often perceived as hinderances rather than
facilitators of innovation, in that to counter discrimination they limit
considerably the margins of choice of contracting authorities. A number of
provisions in the new directives aim at addressing this situation. Article 14 of
Directive 2014/24 lays down specific provisions for research and
development services. A new procedure, the innovation partnership, has been
introduced for the development of an innovative product, service or works as
well as at its subsequent purchase; this procedure leads to a long-term
partnership between a contracting authority and one or more economic
operators in respect of very large projects or smaller innovative projects.84 As
has been rightly remarked, “this is not a typical procedure but a partnership”.85
One could well question whether these new provisions, including the one
82. See the Final Report on Cross-Border Procurement above EU Thresholds available at
<ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/cross-border-proc
urement_en.pdf> (last visited 20 Nov, 2014), and specially table 2. For a discussion of the data:
Sánchez Graells, “Are the procurement rules a barrier to cross-border trade within the European
market? A view on proposals to lower that barrier and spur growth” in Ølykke, Risvig and
Tvarnø, op. cit. supra note 1, at 114 et seq.; unsurprisingly this is the argument of choice for
those criticizing the EU public contract regime per se, e.g. Boyle, op. cit. supra note 32, at NA
171 et seq.
83. See also Rec. 95; see Steinicke “The public procurement rules and innovation” in
Ølykke, Risvig and Tvarnø, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 259 et seq.; Telles and Butler, “Public
procurement award procedures in Directive 2014/24/EU”, and Butler “Innovation in public
procurement: Towards the ‘Innovation Union’”, both in Lichère, Caranta and Treumer, op. cit.
supra note 2, respectively at p. 160 and 351; Cerqueira Gomez, “The innovative innovation
partnership under the 2014 Public Procurement Directive”, (2014) PPLR, at 213 et seq.;
Apostol, “Pre-commercial procurement in support of innovation: regulatory effectiveness”,
(2012) PPLR, 213.
84. See Rec. 49 and Art. 31 of Dir. 2014/24; Rec. 59 and Art. 49 of Dir. 2014/25.
85. Cerqueira Gomez, op. cit. supra note 83, at 212.
CML Rev. 2015406 Caranta
introducing the innovation partnership, are really conducive to innovation.86
The competitive dialogue was already foreseen in 2004 to answer the needs of
innovative contracting authorities.87 Also – but this is a more general problem
which will be addressed later – it has been argued that the new directives
provide too many procedures or purchasing methods whose rationales and
conditions of applications are often hard to distinguish.88
Article 42 of the Public Sector Directive now seems to indicate a preference
for functional and performance-related technical specifications, seen as
appropriate means to favour innovation in public procurement and which
should be used as widely as possible.89
Innovation is relevant as one of the reasons for reform from a different point
of view as well. As Recital 68 of Directive 2014/24 puts it, “[n]ew electronic
purchasing techniques are constantly being developed”. A full chapter of the
Directive is therefore dedicated to techniques and instruments for electronic
and aggregated procurement.90 Technical innovation is providing new
opportunities to cut costs while at the same time possibly contributing to the
integrity of the public procurement process.91 As already recalled, the new
directives place a novel emphasis on the fight against fraud and corruption in
public contract markets.92 The new directives will make the use of electronic
means of communication compulsory.93 The rules on electronic auctions have
been recast, and new provisions have been introduced for purchases from
electronic catalogues.94 The somewhat extensive regulation of this technical
86. See the discussion as to the effectiveness of this instrument by Apostol,
“Pre-commercial procurement in support of innovation: regulatory effectiveness”, PPLR
(2012), at 213 et seq.
87. Telles, “Competitive dialogue: Should rules be fine-tuned to facilitate innovation?” in
Ølykke, Risvig Hansen and Tvarnø, op. cit. supra note 1, at 226 et seq.
88. Cerqueira Gomez, op. cit. supra note 83, 211; this so much so since Rec. 47 of Dir.
2014/24 specifies that pre-commercial procurement is still an option.
89. See also Rec. 74 of Dir. 2014/24; Rec. 83 of Dir. 2014/25.
90. See Lichère and Richetto, “Framework agreements, dynamic purchasing systems and
public e-procurement”, and Racca, “Joint procurement challenges in the future implementation
of the new directives”, both in Lichère, Caranta,Treumer, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 185 et seq. and
p. 225 et seq.
91. As Rec. 52 of Dir. 2014/24 and Rec. 63 of Dir. 2014/25 put it, “Electronic means of
information and communication can greatly simplify the publication of contracts and increase
the efficiency and transparency of procurement processes”.
92. See Sanchez Graells, “Exclusion, qualitative selection and short-listing in the new
public sector procurement Directive 2014/24” in Lichère, Caranta and Treumer, op. cit. supra
note 2, 105 et seq.; see also the contributions collected by Racca and Yukins (Eds.), Integrity
and Efficiency in Sustainable Public Contracts (Bruylant, 2014).
93. Lichère and Richetto, op. cit. supra note 90, p. 188 et seq.
94. See Art. 34, Art. 35 and Art. 36 of Dir. 2014/24 and Art. 52, Art. 53 and Art. 54 of Dir.
2014/25; see Lichère and Richetto, op. cit. supra note 90, p. 206 et seq.
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aspect is linked to the worry that different standards might keep national
markets separate and lead to discrimination of non-national bidders.95
Security of the means of communication is another concern.96 Centralized
purchasing is linked to more technically advanced procurement practices
(even if it often focuses on simple off the shelf goods and services).97
2.6. Linking public contract law to other EU policies, including the fight
against corruption
Strategic use of public contract money is a legitimate and important pillar of
EU law. Contracting authorities are to some extent called to enforce other EU
policies. This approach crystallizes in Article 18(2) of Directive 2014/24,
according to which Member States must take appropriate measures to ensure
that in the performance of public contracts economic operators comply with
applicable obligations in the fields of environmental, social and labour law
established by Union law, national law, collective agreements or by the
international environmental, social and labour law provisions listed in Annex
X.98 This is specifically relevant with reference to the selection of economic
operators called to take part in award procedures. The exclusion regime has
been strengthened and widened under the new directives, also with a view to
help in enforcing environmental, social and labour law.99
The exclusion regime has also been strengthened with the aim of fighting
corruption.100 Integrity of the procurement process is, as already recalled, one
of the additional themes of the reform. Corruption, like collusion, bid-rigging,
conflict of interest and so on distort award procedures and the proper
functioning of the internal market itself.101 Accordingly, in the new directives
we also find a specific provision on conflict of interest.102
95. See also Rec. 55 of Dir. 2014/24 and Rec.66 of Dir. 2014/25.
96. See also Rec. 57 of Dir. 2014/24 and Rec. 68 of Dir. 2014/25.
97. Art. 37 of Dir. 2014/24 and Art. 55 of Dir. 2014/25; see more generally Racca, “The
electronic award of public procurement” in Comba and Treumer, op. cit. supra note 42, esp.
p. 315 et seq.
98. See also Art. 30(3) of Dir. 2014/23 and Art. 36 (2) of Dir. 2014/25; see critically
Sanchez Graells, op. cit. supra note 82, 101et seq.
99. See Steinicke, “Qualification and shortlisting” in Trybus, Caranta, Edelstam, op. cit.
supra note 7, p. 122 et seq.
100. See the detailed analysis by Sanchez Graells, supra note 92, at p. 105 et seq.
101. Arrowsmith, op. cit. supra note 24, at 50 et seq.
102. E.g. Art. 24 of Dir. 2014/24; see also Rec. 13 of the same Directive; see again Sanchez
Graells, supra note 92, p. 111 et seq.
CML Rev. 2015408 Caranta
2.7. Brief conclusions on the objectives of EU public procurement law
In the end, EU institutions lack competence to enact rules solely or principally
aimed at pursuing best value for money for the contracting authorities. As
rightly remarked, “[a]ll the other new objectives of the Directive (green,
social, innovative, corruption) can be connected to specific EU policies.
Efficiency in public spending cannot, because it rests exclusively with the
competence of Member States”.103 In fact, the law would be tidier if the
specific TFEU provisions concerning the environment, social policy and
industry were directly referred to as legal bases alongside the traditional
internal market articles.
3. The institutional dynamics and the political context of public
contracts reform
The above considerations on the reasons of the reform already make it clear
that this was not a simple maintenance exercise. Deep changes have been
introduced in the EU regulatory framework. All parties involved – EU
institutions and the Member States – brought to the process their preferences,
agendas and strategies. Conflicts were in plain view and tripartite dialogue
was needed to iron them out (or sweep them under the carpet).104 The result is
quite complex – and at times perplexing – and this owes much to the
institutional dynamics at play. The process however was quite dynamic and
the democratic institutions of the EU were deeply involved in it.This is in itself
very positive.
3.1. The pro-integration duo performing magic: Where the Court of
Justice helps the Commission in mellowing the resistance of the
Member States
The reform process obviously involved the Commission, the Council, and the
Member States therein, and the Parliament. The CJEU is not formally part of
law making. The EU does not normally follow the French pattern of having a
top court – the Conseil d’Etat – advising on reform (Art. 218 TFEU is
exceptional). In many ways however the Court plays the role of primum
103. Comba, op. cit. supra note 17, at 47; see also Arrowsmith, op. cit. supra note 24, at 83
et seq.
104. A knowledgeable account of the negotiation process is provided in Danish by Risvig
Hamer, “Nyt udbudsdirektiv – væsentlige ændringer”, (2014) Erhvervsjuridisk Tidsskrift, 145;
constructive ambiguity has in the end been much abused in the directives: see Treumer, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 10 et seq.
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movens. It has been rightly noted that “[p]ublic procurement regulation has
evolved dynamically through the Court’s jurisprudence”,105 so that “the Court
of Justice has been the inspiration of some of the most fundamental and
important novelties in the new Public Procurement Directive”.106
As usual, Recital 2 of Directive 2014/24 acknowledges the need to
incorporate certain aspects of well-established case law of the ECJ. However,
this formula looks very much like an understatement. In recent years the case
law has not just clarified the law, but has both overturned some basic
assumptions – or understandings – underlying the old public procurement
directives and laid down rules for novel aspects of public contract practice.
For instance the Council had always opposed EU rules being applicable to
service concessions. Basically concessions are used to award services of
general economic interest – SGEIs. While outsourcing the provisions of these
services, the contracting authorities are still held accountable for their quality
by users. This involves the need to change the contract to adapt it to changing
demands from the public. Quite often those services to be provided according
to the universal service principle still require considerable infusions of public
money.107 In many Member States their providers were privatized recently,
and privatization was often only in form, the State or another public law entity
still being the major if not the only shareholder. In this situation a good number
of Member States, including France, wanted to keep their hands free when
choosing concessionaires. Unsurprisingly, considering that contract notices
were rarely advertised at EU level, concessions were usually awarded to
domestic undertakings.108
In 2000 the jealousy of the Member States was badly shaken by
Telaustria.109 Telekom Austria, which was at the time wholly owned by the
State, published in a local newspaper an invitation to submit tenders for a
public service concession for the production and publication of printed and
electronically accessible telephone directories. Telaustria and Telefonadress
took the view that public procurement award procedures should have applied
and challenged the procedure followed.The ECJ recalled that the Commission
had expressly proposed that “public service concessions” be included within
the scope of Directive 92/50/EEC. However, it added that “during the
105. Bovis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 461.
106. Treumer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 17.
107. See the results of the research managed by CSES as summarized at p. 5 of the
report available at <ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/concessions/cs
es_en.pdf> (last visited 28 Nov.2014).
108. See the results in the report by the College of Europe available at <ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/concessions/college_europe_en.pdf>(last revisited
28 Nov.2014).
109. Case C-324/98, Telaustria, EU:C:2000:669.
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legislative process, the Council eliminated all references to public service
concessions, in particular because of the differences between the Member
States as regards the delegation of the management of public services and
modes of delegation, which could create a situation of very great imbalance in
the opening-up of the public concession contracts.”110 Had the legislature
wished to include concessions within the scope of the directives, it would have
done so expressly, as it did when adopting the public works Directive.111
However, according to the ECJ, the fact that service concessions did not fall
within the scope of the procurement directives did not rule out all relevance of
EC (now EU) law. More specifically, the Court held that the contracting
entities are “bound to comply with the fundamental rules of the Treaty, in
general, and the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality,
in particular”.112 Following the judgment in Unitron Scandinavia, “that
principle implies, in particular, an obligation of transparency in order to
enable the contracting authority to satisfy itself that the principle has been
complied with”.113 The Court also felt it necessary to give some indication as
to the content of the obligation of transparency, stating that it “consists in
ensuring, for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of advertising
sufficient to enable the services market to be opened up to competition and the
impartiality of procurement procedures to be reviewed”.114 As has been
remarked: “This statement lacks clarity, but not importance”.115
Service concessions were still not regulated in the 2004 directives, but the
pressure was already mounting on the Member States. The Commission had
started a sustained campaign against direct awards, some of which had taken
place through the award of service concessions. In one infringement action
against Germany the ECJ had held that Germany had breached EU law when
one of its municipalities directly awarded a long term contract for the
110. Ibid., para 48.
111. Ibid., para 56.
112. Ibid., para 60; the judgement and the following case law has been thoroughly
investigated by Risvig Hansen, op. cit. supra note 73; see also Risvig Hamer, “Treaty
requirements for contracts ‘outside’ the procurement Directives” in Trybus, Caranta and
Edelstam, op. cit. supra note 7, pp. 191–219; the analysis is extended to the case law in a
number of Member States in the contributions collected by Dragos and Caranta (Eds.),Outside
the EU Procurement Directives – Inside the Treaty? (DJØF, 2013).
113. Case C-324/98, Telaustria, para 61, referring to Case C-275/98,Unitron Scandinavia,
EU:C:1999:567; the principle of transparency has been investigated by Drijber and Stergiou,
op. cit. supra note 5, 809 et seq; Risvig Hamer, op. cit. supra note 73, 193 et seq, and please also
refer to Caranta, “Transparence et concurrence” in Noguellou and Stelkens, op. cit. supra note
17, pp. 154–172.
114. Case C-324/98, Telaustria, para 62.
115. Treumer, “The discretionary powers of contracting entities – towards a flexible
approach in the recent case law of the Court of Justice?”, (2006) PPLR, 82.
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collection of waste water.116 The Commission thereafter brought a second
infringement action, claiming that Germany had failed to comply with the first
judgment by leaving the contract to stand, being content to write to the
responsible authority to comply with the rules on the publication of calls for
tenders when awarding future contracts. According to Germany and a number
of Member States which had intervened in the proceedings, the principles of
legal certainty, of protection of legitimate expectations, of pacta sunt
servanda, and the fundamental right to property, inter alia, precluded the
termination of the contracts at issue. The ECJ curtly retorted that those
principles might be used against the contracting authority by the other party to
the contract in the event of termination, but Member States cannot rely on
them to justify the non-implementation of a judgment establishing a failure to
fulfil obligations and thereby evade their own liability under (then)
Community law.117 This judgement put a very high price on direct award, both
for the contracting authority and its contractor. The stakes were only raised
when direct awards were listed as a major breach of EU law normally leading
to ineffectiveness of the contract under Article of Directive 89/665/EEC, as
amended by Directive 2007/66/EC.118
Service concessions were just one front in the war against direct awards.
Abuses of the in-house doctrine, which will be analysed below,119 very much
took centre stage in this fight.120 One of these judgments, Parking Brixen,
involved service concessions to an in-house entity.121 The ECJ reaffirmed the
applicability to the award of service concessions of the principles of equal
treatment and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and the duty of
transparency linked to them.122 This rule has often been repeated since then,123
the case law having specified that this is the case when the contract at issue
presents a cross-border interest.124
The freedom the Member States expected from the absence of regulation of
service concessions suddenly evaporated. The risk was the development of a
case law imposing more and more detailed obligations upon contracting
116. Joined Cases C-20 & 28/01, Commission v. Germany, EU:C:2003:220.
117. Case C-503/04, Commission v. Germany, EU:C:2007:432, para 36.
118. Bovis, op. cit. supra note 8, at 387.
119. See infra section 4.4.
120. Case C-29/04,Commission v.Austria, EU:C:2005:670; Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and
RPL Lochau; Case C-231/03, Coname, EU:C:2005:487; Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen,
EU:C:2005:605.
121. Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen.
122. Para 48 et seq.
123. E.g. Case C-221/12, Belgacom NV, EU:C:2013:736, para 28; Case C-347/06, ASM
Brescia, EU:C:2008:416, paras. 58 and 59.
124. E.g. Case C-221/12, Belgacom NV, para 31 et seq.; Case C-388/12, Comune di
Ancona,EU:C:2013:734, para 50 et seq.
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authorities. Already, directly awarded service concessions had to be
terminated to comply with EU obligations. When given the chance to legislate
again, the Member States were finally ready to accept the Commission’s
proposal for an EU directive on concessions, encompassing both works and
service concessions whose value exceeds a fairly high threshold.125 As a sort
of compensation, the Member States included resounding proclamations of
the “principle of free administration by public authorities” and of their
“freedom to define services of general economic interest” in Articles 2 and 4
of Directive 2014/23 – which were both absent in the Commission proposal
and were introduced during the legislative process. As already remarked, this
is mirrored in Article 1(4) of Directive 2014/24.126
These institutional dynamics and the opposing roles played by the Member
States and the Commission (and the ECJ) are not manifest in Directive
2014/23. Its recitals very much stress the necessity to do away with the legal
uncertainties related to possibly divergent interpretation of the Treaty
principles.127 Uncertainties are indeed a risk inherent in a regime based on
case law,128 and the recitals avow that the case law has “only partially
addressed certain aspects of the award of concession contracts”.129 In line
with the subsidiarity principle (expressly referred to in Recital 87), Directive
2014/23 designs a procedurally light regime, and Recital 8 refers to the need of
“a minimum coordination” of award procedures. Much of the Directive
consists of provisions defining its scope of application. The procedural rules
are quite basic.130
In a way, the Member States have been pushed by the combined efforts of
the Commission and the ECJ to accept EU secondary law rules on
concessions as a lesser of two evils as compared with judicial law-making –
often prompted by the Commission by means of infringement procedures.131
However – as a compromise – the rules actually enacted place only limited
constraints on contracting authorities or entities. One could even doubt
whether the obligations flowing from the treaties have been really clarified.
Another question is whether the remaining discretion will be left undisturbed
by future ECJ decisions. Legislation does not always put institutional dynamic
to rest. Indeed, and this is the most potent engine of EU law, competitors might
125. See also Rec. 23.
126. See also Rec. 7.
127. See Rec. 1, 2 and 4.
128. See with specific reference to our topic Sanchez Graells, op. cit. supra note 21, at 94.
129. Rec. 4, emphasis added.
130. See also infra section 5.
131. The outcome was long seen coming: Neergaard, “Public service concessions and
related concepts – the increased pressure from Community law on Member States’ use of
concessions’”, (2007) PPLR, at 398 et seq.
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still be willing to challenge the exercise of discretion by the buyers, and
national courts might well be willing – and in some cases bound – to ask the
Court for further clarification. Even if the EU legislature has shown much
restraint, an increase in the number of rules on the award of concessions might
yet be in the cards.132
Not that the ECJ has constantly sought to widen the scope of application of
EU rules (or to limit the margins of choice of contracting authorities).The case
law on both in-house providing and public-public cooperation (discussed
below) attests otherwise, since exceptions to the applicability of the old
directives were recognized by the Court.133
3.2. Institutional drama, or of where and when the ECJ nurtured
sustainable procurement, finally helping the Parliament (and some
Member States) to break the resistance of the Commission
In fact, it cannot be said that the ECJ constantly sides with the Commission.
“At times the Court can be seen as attempting to tame the Commission’s
wilder single market fantasies”.134 The case law on sustainable procurement is
possibly the best instance in point. The ECJ has taken the lead over a
recalcitrant Commission in developing the law. The result has been a slowly
unfolding drama involving other protagonists – Member States and litigants,
and more recently the European Parliament and the political forces therein.135
In the First Act, the Commission tries to enforce internal market orthodoxy,
taking the oracular utterances of the ECJ literally. It all started with Beentjes,
decided in 1982.136 A contract was awarded to the second lowest bidder
because the first was not capable of complying with an obligation to employ
long-term unemployed persons. The ECJ first considered that such a
condition had no relation to the checking of contractors’ suitability on the
basis of their economic and financial standing and their technical knowledge
and ability or to the criteria for the award of contracts.137 This led the Court to
qualify the requirement in question as an “additional specific condition”,
132. See also Craven, “The EU’s 2014 Concessions Directive’”, (2014) PPLR, at 197; see
also the reading of Case C-388/12, Comune di Ancona, EU:C:2013:734 and its discussion by
Albert Sanchez Graells at <howtocrackanut.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/cjeu-kicks-new-con
cessions-directive-in.html> (last visited 28 Nov.2014); more generally and in the same vein
Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, para 1.82.
133. See infra section 4.4.
134. Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, para 1.74.
135. The role of the European Parliament in this area is stressed by Gormley, “New rules in
Public Procurement – for better, for worse, or another dog’s breakfast?” in Bregman, Bröring
and de Graaf (Eds.), Onbegrendse rechtsbeoefening (Lubach-bundel), (IBR, 2014), p. 174.
136. Case 31/87, Beentjes.
137. Ibid., para 28.
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which must comply with the general principles of (then) EEC law and must be
mentioned in the contract notice, so that contractors may become aware of its
existence.138 The Commission responded by developing the notion of contract
performance condition as distinct from both selection and award criteria.139
On this basis it structured an infringement procedure against France.140 The
notices for school buildings works set out the award criteria included an
“additional criterion” relating to the promotion of employment. The
Commission claimed that such a requirement could be used only as a contract
performance condition, not as an award criterion; this was also because (then)
Community law allowed two award criteria only, namely the lowest price and
the most economically advantageous tender. The ECJ however held that,
provided the Treaty general principles were complied with, the procurement
directives did not “preclude all possibility for the contracting authorities to use
as a criterion a condition linked to the campaign against unemployment”.141
Having rejected the Commission’s main argument, the Court found the
Commission’s action wanting.142
In the Second Act, the Commission repeats its past mistakes, clinging to
words and small phrases uttered by the ECJ to try and keep internal market
orthodoxy pure. Concordia Bus concerned a contract notice for the urban
transport bus network of the Municipality of Helsinki.143 The contract was to
be awarded to the undertaking whose tender was most economically
advantageous taking into account inter alia the quality of the vehicle fleet,
with additional points awarded for the use of buses with limited nitrogen oxide
emissions and external noise, and the operator’s quality and environment
programme, with additional points to be awarded for a body of certified
qualitative criteria and for a certified environment programme. In the
procedure, the Commission claimed that only those criteria resulting in a
direct benefit of an economic nature to the procuring entities could be allowed.
The ECJ, following the Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, held otherwise.
According to the Court, the words “for example” used by the Directive in
introducing a list of possible criteria making up the most economically
advantageous tender “read together with [then] Article 6 EC Treaty lead to the
conclusion that public procurement law does not exclude the possibility for
the contracting authority of using criteria relating to the preservation of the
138. Ibid., para 36.
139. See e.g. the recent Buying social. A Guide to TakingAccount of Social Considerations
in Public Procurement, (Publication Office of the EU, 2010), at 43 et seq.
140. Case C-225/98, Commission v. France EU:C:2000:494.
141. Ibid., para 50 et seq.
142. Ibid., para 53.
143. Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus, EU:C:2002:495.
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environment when assessing the economically most advantageous tender”.144
Here again the ECJ conceded something to internal market concerns.145
Besides the usual need to comply with the general principles of the Treaty,
the non-economic criteria had to be “linked to the subject-matter of the
contract”.146 This approach was affirmed in EVN, concerning the
procurement of green electricity in Austria.147
Concordia Bus was a major judgment, so much so that it was referred to in
Recital 1 of Directive 2004/18/EC as a reason for redrafting public
procurement rules. The Commission however went on fighting. While both
the judgment and the new Directive required the link to the subject-matter of
the contract with specific reference to award criteria only, the Commission in
its documents made it a requirement for other phases of the procurement
process, such as the qualification or the contract performance clauses.148
Reference to production processes was however what the Commission was
prepared to go to battle against. In its Communication on integrating
environmental considerations into public procurement, the Commission
opined that reference to a specific production process was possible only if this
did not restrict competition and helped “to specify the performance
characteristics (visible or invisible) of the product or service”.149 One might
have been excused for thinking that public procurement law was being turned
over to psychics; the problem was however very practical. For instance, green
energy is not materially different from normal energy: only the production
process is. But that is where the Commission would rather not go,
notwithstanding that the ECJ had opened up this possibility in EVN.150
In the Final (so far) Act, the ECJ roundly rebukes the Commission, and the
European Parliament seizes the opportunity to firmly root sustainable
procurement in the directives.
A more detailed analysis than is permissible here should not treat the
Commission as an indivisible entity. The preferences embodied in what until a
few months ago was DG Market diverge from those defended by DG ENV or
DG EMPL, as was clear from the enormous amount of time needed to adopt
144. Ibid., para 57.
145. Which are well analysed by Hettne, “Sustainable public procurement and the Single
Market – Is there a conflict of interest?”, 8 EPPPL (2013), 31–40, and Weller and Meissner
Pritchard, “Evolving CJEU jurisprudence: Balancing sustainability considerations with the
requirements of the internal market”, 8 EPPPL (2013), 55–59.
146. Para 58 et seq; Martens and de Margerie, “The link to the subject-matter of the contract
in green and social procurement”, 8 EPPPL (2013), 8–18.
147. Case C-448/01, EVN and Wienstrom, EU:C:2003:651.
148. E.g. Buying social…, cited supra note 139, at 6 et seq.
149. COM(2001)274 final, point II.1.2.; see also COM(2001)566 final, point 1.2.
150. Case C-448/01,EVN and Wienstrom; see critically Arrowsmith, op. cit. supra note 23,
at 80 et seq.
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the Guide to taking into account social consideration in public
procurement.151 Making distinctions within the Commission would help
avoid the conclusion that the disconnect in the Commission proposals
between spirited references to Europa 2020 and sustainability, and the very
minimal changes proposed to the rules on sustainable procurement was due to
bureaucratic double talk aimed at pleasing some stakeholders without really
changing things. The substantive point is that the proposal was modest, to put
it kindly. Then came the judgment in Max Havelaar.152 This case stemmed
from infringement proceedings brought against the Netherlands because the
province of North Holland had set an award criterion relating to the fact that
the ingredients to be supplied were to bear the Eko and/or Max Havelaar
labels. The Commission complained that a link to the subject-matter of the
contract was absent, insofar as those labels do not concern the products to be
supplied themselves, but the general policy of the tenderers (especially in the
case of the Max Havelaar label). According to Advocate General Kokott,
however, the Max Havelaar label, while not defining any product
characteristics in the strict sense, does:
“provide information on whether or not the goods to be supplied were
traded fairly. Such a factor can be taken into consideration in connection
with conditions relating to performance of a contract (Article 26 of
Directive 2004/18/EC). It cannot therefore be denied at the outset that it
lacks any connection with the subject-matter of the contract (in this case,
the supply of ‘ingredients’ such as sugar, milk powder and cocoa). From
the point of view of a contracting authority which, as the contract
documents show, attaches importance to socially responsible trade, the
question whether or not the goods to be supplied were purchased from the
producer thereof on fair conditions can indeed be relevant in determining
best value for money. Of course the taste of sugar does not vary depending
on whether it was traded fairly or unfairly. A product placed on the market
on unfair conditions does however leave a bitter taste in the mouth of a
socially responsible customer.”153
This is as strong an endorsement of social considerations in public
procurement as there could possibly be. What is not allowed under EU law is
for a contracting authority to want to assess the general purchasing policy of
potential tenderers and to take into consideration whether all the goods in its
product range are fair trade, irrespective of whether or not they are the
subject-matter of the contract, but this was not the case with the contract
151. Buying social…, cited supra note 139, 240.
152. Case C-368/10, Commission v. Netherlands, EU:C:2012:284.
153. Ibid., para 110.
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notice at issue. The Opinion was fully followed by the ECJ, which held that
contracting authorities are “authorized to choose the award criteria based on
considerations of a social nature, which may concern the persons using or
receiving the works, supplies or services which are the object of the contract,
but also other persons”.154 Moreover the Court stressed that “there is no
requirement that an award criterion relates to an intrinsic characteristic of a
product”.155
Max Havelaar closed the inter-institutional debate on award criteria. The
proposal was changed, and now Article 67(3) clearly states that award criteria
shall be considered to be linked to the subject-matter where they relate to any
stage of the life cycle of the goods or services purchased, including the
specific process of production, provision or trading, “even where factors do
not form part of their material substance”. The last clarification is not an
oblique reference to Saint Thomas Aquinas and to medieval logic; it intends to
sweep away the weak categories to which the Commission clung in its fight
against taking into account production processes in awarding public
contracts.156 The production process is now relevant in principle rather than
exceptionally. Only, in line with Advocate General Kokott’s Opinion in Max
Havelaar,157 “the condition of a link with the subject-matter of the contract
excludes criteria and conditions relating to general corporate policy, which
cannot be considered as a factor characterizing the specific process of
production or provision of the purchased works, supplies or services.
Contracting authorities should hence not be allowed to require tenderers to
have a certain corporate social or environmental responsibility policy in
place”.158
As already recalled, there are also safeguards in the way the life cycle cost
analysis has been structured in Article 68 of Directive 2014/24. Here again
the Commission has been forced to cede some ground. The proposal required
methodologies used for the calculation of the life cycle cost to be “established
for repeated or continuous application”. This was repealed at the instance of
the European Parliament and now under Article 68(2)(a), where the
methodology has not been established for repeated or continuous application,
“it shall not unduly favour or disadvantage certain economic operators”.
The Commission did manage to get some limited satisfaction. The “link to
the subject-matter” has metastasized throughout the directives.159 Besides
154. Ibid., para 85.
155. Ibid., para 91.
156. This also appears in Rec. 64 of Dir. 2014/23, whose Art. 41 does not have the details
found in Art. 67 of Dir. 2014/24. See Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, para 4.42.
157. Case C-368/10, Commission v. Netherlands, EU:C:2012:284, para 88.
158. Rec. 97 Dir. 2014/24.
159. Or, as Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, para 4.42, puts it: it has snowballed.
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Article 67(3) of Directive 2014/24 on award criteria it pops up for instance in
Article 42(1) on technical specifications; Article 43(1)(a) and (2) on labels;
Article 45 on variants, and in Article 70 on contract performance
conditions.160 As the last provision makes clear, the link in question has to be
understood in relation to the life cycle as defined with reference to award
criteria.
3.3. It’s not all light: Of where the Court of Justice muddled up public
procurement law, and other institutions tried to tidy up (but were not
necessary successful)
The ECJ is clearly a major engine in the development of EU public contract
law. The results are not, however, always positive.161 The case law on the
notions of both procurement and concession contracts has not always helped
make the law clearer: the hope was that the new provisions enacted would
help. Forecasts for concessions based on the wording of Article 5 of Directive
2014/23 are fair. The skies seem less clear for procurement, the new definition
provided in Article 1(2) of Directive 2014/24 still leaving wide margins of
ambiguity.162
The most egregious mishap in the case law is however Lianakis.163 The
contract notice listed as award criteria: the proven experience of the expert on
projects carried out over the last three years; the firm’s manpower and
equipment; and its ability to complete the project by the anticipated deadline,
together with its commitments and its professional potential. Referring to
Beentjes,164 the ECJ, while accepting that EU law does not in theory preclude
the examination of the tenderers’ suitability and the award of the contract from
taking place simultaneously, stressed that the two procedures are nevertheless
distinct and are governed by different rules.165 This approach met with
resounding criticism and was not always followed in the Member States. The
quality of the performer is obviously relevant in many cases and may justify a
higher contract price.166 As has rightly been stressed “[t]he experience of the
160. Art. 58(1) on selection criteria has a somewhat different formulation, requiring them to
be “related and proportionated to the subject-matter”.
161. See also the issues raised by Treumer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 18 et seq.
162. See infra section 4.2.
163. Case C532/06, Lianakis and Others, EU:C:2008:40.
164. Case 31/87, Beentjes.
165. Ibid., para 26.
166. See Treumer, “The distinction between selection and award criteria in EC public
procurement law: A rule without exception?”, (2009) PPLR, 103–111, 111; and the reports on
the domestic situation in a number of Member States published in the same issue of the Public
Procurement Law Review; see also the economic analysis on the role of reputation in
procurement by Spagnolo, supra note 80, at 30 et seq.
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proposed staff to provide the services may be used as a proxy for measuring
the means for managing the risk of under-performance of the contract”.167
While the Commission was ready to relax the separation of qualification
and award criteria for service contracts and for contracts involving the design
of works, the Parliament introduced in what later became Article 67(2)(b) of
Directive 2014/24, the less stringent reference to a significant impact on the
level of performance of the contract – thus doing away with the Lianakis
doctrine.168
Surprisingly, a chamber of the ECJ has recently reaffirmed the Lianakis
case law without even mentioning the new directives.169 This points to some
major issues in the working of the EU institutions. The Commission has been
enforcing Lianakis orthodoxy, but at the same time it was accepting (to say the
least) that the rigid distinction between selection and award criteria does not
(always) make public procurement sense. The real issue was never raised in
the case, and the ECJ, which proceeded without an Opinion of the Advocate
General, simply ignored the developments in EU law, sticking to its own
precedents. The Court will soon be provided with an opportunity to review its
precedents. In his well-reasoned Opinion in Ambisig, Advocate General
Wathelet, while intentionally focusing his analysis on Directive 2014/24, has
concluded that the experience of those who will actually perform the contract
is indeed a relevant and permissible award criterion in the procurement of
some intellectual service contracts.170
Another questionable judgment concerned the treatment of eco- and
social-labels in the already recalled Max Havelaar case.171 Labels are
shortcuts providing information, in this case that the works, services or
supplies correspond to the required characteristics. In the infringement
proceedings at issue the notice for the award of a public contract required
tenderers to have either the Max Havelaar or EKO label. Advocate General
Kokott considered that contracting authorities do not need to list separately in
their contract documents every individual specification which forms part of
an eco-label; rather, they are free to refer in the contract documents, by a
simple reference to eco-labels, in general and to all the specifications on
which those labels are based.172 In her view, an overall reference to all
specifications on which an eco-label is based is compatible with the principle
167. Bordalo Faustino, “Evaluation models in public procurement” in Comba and Treumer,
op. cit. supra note 41, pp. 339–358.
168. See Treumer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 15 et seq. and 20, writing of Lianakis being
overruled.
169. Case C-641/13 P, Spain v. Commission, EU:C:2014:2264.
170. Case C-601/13, Ambising, Opinion of 18 Dec. 2014.
171. Case C-368/10, Commission v. Netherlands, EU:C:2012:284.
172. Ibid., para 52.
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of transparency, “since a reasonably well-informed tenderer of normal
diligence can indeed be expected to be familiar with the eco-labels used on the
relevant market or at least to obtain information on such labels from the bodies
certifying them”.173 The ECJ, siding with the Commission, thought
otherwise, holding that Article 23(6) of the Public Sector Directive confers on
contracting authorities the option to use the detailed specifications of an
eco-label, but not the eco-label as such; the obligation of the contracting
authority to mention expressly the detailed environmental characteristics it
intends to impose even where it refers to the characteristics defined by an
eco-label, is considered to be indispensable in order to allow potential
tenderers to refer to a single official document.174
The problem is that, while (unlike Lianakis) this judgment is based on
relevant concerns about transparency, (like Lianakis) it makes very little
public procurement sense – and no sustainable public procurement sense –
because it places a burden on contracting authorities which might easily
discourage them from referring to labels at all.
What is remarkable is that all institutions were on the same page during the
reform process. The Commission proposal allowed contracting authorities to
refer directly to labels – as now foreseen in Article 43(1) of Directive 2014/24
– which also lays down the safeguards to be complied with. According to a
further provision inserted in the trilogue, it is only where contracting
authorities do not require the works, supplies or services to meet all the
requirements of the label that they must indicate which label requirements are
referred to. So as not to limit competition too much, contracting authorities are
under an obligation to accept equivalent labels and, under given conditions,
alternative means of proof.175 This makes the life of contracting authorities
somewhat simpler, but also means that the assessment whether the label
requirements only concern criteria which are linked to the subject-matter of
the contract and are appropriate to define characteristics of the works,
supplies or services that are the subject-matter of the contract does not need to
be repeated requirement by requirement, but is passed at a more abstract level.
These instances show that the “political institutions” may well – and in
some cases it is submitted should – correct the ECJ when it interprets
secondary law.176 It may well be the case that the interpretation offered by the
Court is not conducive to the soundest possible working of public
procurement rules (or of any rules, for that matter). True: the ECJ dit pour le
droit. But it is not infallible. It is submitted that, when proposing legislation,
173. Ibid., para 56.
174. Ibid., para 63 et seq.
175. See Dragos and Neamtu, op. cit. supra note 34, 321 et seq and 332 et seq.
176. See also Treumer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 10.
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the Commission may be more critical than it is at present. As will be shown
when discussing the definition of procurement contract, clinging to every
word of the Court does not always help clarify the law. The position is
obviously different when the Court is interpreting the Treaties. Unless and
until the Treaties are changed, all EU institutions are bound by the
construction placed on them by the ECJ. This does not mean that the Court
should not be more ready to openly concede that its precedents might have
been wrong, or at least to approach them more critically. But it is also possible
that the recent judgment reaffirming Lianakis was simply given “per
incuriam”, as the English might have it (when writing Latin).177
3.4. Of More Shadows: A few additional tales of a somewhat timid
Commission and (often) messy political institutions (and Member
States).
The proposals from the Commission were conservative in many respects. If
the proposal for a Concessions Directive is set aside for a moment, and the lip
service paid to the Europa 2020 strategy, what was put on the table looked
more like maintenance of the existing rules in the light of the case law and of
technological developments rather than fundamental changes. Admittedly
some truly innovative proposals, such as the European Procurement Passport,
were simply shot down by the “political institutions” afraid of more
bureaucracy imposed by Brussels.According to the Commission proposal, the
Passport was to be used to prove the qualification of economic operators and
had to be issued by national authorities.178 In what has become Article 59 of
Directive 2014/24 we have now the European Single Procurement Document,
consisting of an updated self-declaration which has the simple value of
preliminary evidence, replacing certificates issued by public authorities.179
It is also lamentable that, in the process leading to the adoption of the new
directives, the provisions on governance in the Commission proposal were
much watered down at the insistence of a group of Member States. The same
is true of the single independent body responsible for the oversight and
coordination of implementation activities, whose institution in each Member
State was foreseen in the Commission proposal.180 This might have led, as has
happened in other areas of EU law, to the creation of a network of independent
177. Young v. Bristol Airplane Company Ltd [1944] 1 KB 718 (CA) springs to the mind
when reading the judgment (so far available in French and Spanish only).
178. The actual usefulness of the proposal had however been questioned: see Sanchez
Graells, op. cit. supra note 92, at 124 et seq.
179. See Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, para 4.22 et seq.; Sanchez Graells, op. cit. supra
note 92, 119 et seq.; Trybus, op. cit. supra note 15, 267 et seq.
180. See also Rec. 49 of the proposal.
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administrative authorities, ultimately answering to the Commission.181 These
authorities would inevitably end up acting as the Commission’s eyes,
reporting cases of fraud, corruption, conflict of interests and other serious
irregularities, thus making easier the launch of infringement proceedings.
Unsurprisingly this too was killed by the Council, the Member States being
obviously keen on keeping the monitoring of the application of public
procurement rules under their control. So as not to be too bothered by an
inquisitive Commission, the Member States were cheeky enough to have
inserted in what has become Article 83(3) of Directive 2014/24 a provision
forbidding the Commission to request them to provide information on the
practical implementation of national strategic procurement policies more than
once every three years. It is of course doubtful whether this is consistent with
the Commission’s Treaty-granted role of guardian of the respect of EU law.
The choices just outlined will not contribute to the effectiveness of EU
public contract law.At least, however, they are transparent enough in both their
motivation and in the wording of the resulting provisions. Elsewhere,
however, the political pressure has resulted in indigestible provisions.182
Article 67 of Directive 2014/24, on award criteria, is a good case in point.
Traditionally, two award criteria were foreseen in EU legislation: the lowest
price and the most economically advantageous tender or MEAT (which, as we
learned from Concordia Bus may also comprise not strictly economic
criteria).183 The Commission proposal somewhat echoed Article 53(1) of
Directive 2004/18, with “cost” taking the place of “price” in what should have
become the “lowest cost”. Lowest cost, in turn, could be based on either price
or a cost-effectiveness approach, such as life-cycle costing.184 The most
advantageous tender was to include, in addition to price or cost, some of the
criteria making up the old MEAT. Sharing a deeply felt suspicion against the
lowest price as conducive to social dumping, the European Parliament
proposed a radically new text providing for just one criterion, the MEAT.185
The Council moved back to the Commission’s proposal based on the
traditional two award criteria. The final text of the first part of Article 67(2)
owes much to the text approved by the European Parliament, only made more
hard to understand (if that was possible). The first part of the provision now
reads:
181. See generally Chiti, “Decentralisation and integration into the Community
administrations: A new perspective on European agencies”, 10 ELJ (2004), 402–438, 403.
182. See also, for more instances, Treumer, op. cit. supra note 3, 21 et seq.
183. Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus.
184. See Dragos and Neamtu, op. cit. supra 34, nt. 31.
185. See Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, para 4.40.
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“The most economically advantageous tender from the point of view of
the contracting authority shall be identified on the basis of the price or
cost, using a cost-effectiveness approach, such as life-cycle costing in
accordance with Article 68, and may include the best price-quality ratio,
which shall be assessed on the basis of criteria, including qualitative,
environmental and/or social aspects, linked to the subject-matter of the
public contract in question.”
Beside the fact that the lowest price is still obviously an option, we have a
provision collapsing together price, cost, cost-effectiveness and price-quality
ratio in a way that will require much ingenuity from the practitioners and the
courts to understand.186 A reasonable assumption seems to be that contracts
may be awarded either to a) the lowest price; b) the lowest life-cycle costing,
c) the best price-quality ratio, or d) a combination of the latter two. True,
Article 67(2) seems to indicate that life cycle costing is only one type of
cost-effectiveness. However it is difficult to think of additional hypotheses of
cost-effectiveness going beyond life cycle costing plus (some aspects of) the
very broad criterion referred to as best price-quality ratio.187
Similarly muddled outcomes and partly less noble motives characterize the
present regime of service procurements following the demise of the traditional
distinction between priority and non-priority services.188 New entries among
excluded service contracts, added at the request of the European Parliament in
what has become Article 10, include a long list of legal services.189 An alien
landing in Brussels to study EU law would be both surprised and intrigued to
discover how much effort has been spent on ambulance services.190 In
Ambulanz Glöckner, the ECJ held that providing on the market and for
remuneration emergency transport services and patient transport services
constitutes an economic activity for the purposes of the application of the
Treaty competition rules.191 The Commission took lessons from Ambulanz
Glöckner and brought two distinct infringement procedures against Italy and
Ireland because of direct awards of ambulance services. The Irish ambulances
case is not of interest here, since the ECJ held that the Commission had failed
186. See Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, para 4.41.
187. Cf. Caranta, “Award criteria under EU law (old and new)” in Comba and Treumer, op.
cit. supra note 41, p. 36 et seq.
188. See Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, para 1.36 et seq; see also Caranta, “Mapping the
margins of EU public contracts law: Covered, mixed, excluded and special contracts” in
Lichère, Caranta and Treumer, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 87 et seq.
189. See again Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, para 1.39 et seq.
190. See also Caranta, op. cit. supra note 188, 84 et seq; and see Case C-50/14, CASTA,
pending.
191. Case C-475/99, Ambulanz Glöckner, EU:C:2001:577, paras. 21 and 22.
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to prove that the arrangement at issue indeed amounted to a public
procurement contract.192 In the Italian ambulances case, however, the ECJ
confirmed Ambulanz Glöckner, holding that NGOs providing such services
are indeed market operators. The direct award of a number of contracts for
healthcare transport services without a call for tenders in Tuscany was
therefore found to be in breach of the internal market general principles.193
A few years later, new infringement proceedings were brought, this time
against Germany due to practice of awarding contracts for public emergency
services in some Länder.The ECJ rules out that the activities in question could
be considered to be connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official
authority, as such falling outside the scope of the Treaty and derived
provisions.194 The Commission had distinguished between contracts awarded
for public ambulance services characterized by the predominance of the value
of transport services as compared with the value of health services, and
contracts characterized instead by the predominance of the value of latter
services. While the former fall under the full rigour of the regime of the
Directive, contracts where the value of health services predominate were
considered as non-priority services. The ECJ however did not elaborate on the
distinction, since the Commission had failed to prove which was the
predominant component of the contracts at issue.195
While Article 10(h) of Directive 2014/24 reflects the same distinction
between health (emergency) and transport ambulance services, their legal
regime has been shifted and made more flexible.Among the excluded services
under Article 10(h) are civil protection, and danger prevention servicese
provided by non-profit organizations or associations (including those covered
by CPV code 85143000-3, which is the general label for ambulance services);
Article 10(h) expressly excludes “patient transport ambulance services” from
the exception. This means that, while patient transport ambulance services are
now covered by the Directive, emergency ambulance services are excluded
when provided by NPOs.196 As a consequence, in some situations emergency
ambulance services may no longer be considered to fall under what was the
192. Case C-532/03, Commission v. Ireland, EU:C:2007:801; Brown, “The Commission
loses another action against Ireland owing to lack of evidence: A note on Case C-532/03
Commission v. Ireland”, 17 PPLR (2008), NA92.
193. Case C-119/06, Commission v. Italy, EU:C:2007:729; see Brown, “Application of the
Directives to contracts to Non-for-profit organisations and transparency under the EC Treaty:
A note on Case C-119/06 Commission v. Italy”, 17 PPLR (2008), NA96.
194. Case C-160/08, Commission v. Germany, EU:C:2010:230, para 94 et seq.
195. Ibid., para 116 et seq; the distinction has, however, been referred to in the Opinion of
A.G. Wahl in Case C-113/13, ASL No 5 Spezzino, EU:C:2014:291.
196. See also Rec. 28 of Dir. 2014/24; see also Rec. 36 of Dir. 2014/23 and Rec. 36 of Dir.
2014/25.
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regime for non-priority services and are therefore fully outside the scope of
the directive.197 At the same time, “patient transport ambulance services” are
listed in Annex XIV since all ambulance services in principle fall within the
relevant range of CPV codes. As a consequence, they now qualify as special
services under Article 74.198
Indeed Directive 2014/24, while doing away with the distinction between
priority and non-priority services, has introduced an ad hoc regime for social
and other special services characterized by higher thresholds of application
and very flexible rules on award procedures.199 This flows from the
Commission staff working paper “Evaluation Report: Impact and
Effectiveness of EU Public Procurement Legislation” which suggested that
the exclusion of certain services from the full application of the Public Sector
Directive should be reviewed, extending the full application of this directive to
a number of services.200 The definition of these services is in Article 74 of
Directive 2014/24, which in turn refers to Annex XIV for a more precise
description and CPV numbering. As a result of the tug-of-war between the EU
institutions201 combined with “ferocious lobbying”,202 the list is quite long,
and includes health, social and related services, administrative social,
educational, healthcare and cultural services, compulsory social security
services but also some surprising entries like tyre-remoulding and blacksmith
services.203
To make a complex framework even more complex, Article 77 of Directive
2014/24 allows Member States to provide that contracting authorities may
reserve the right for organizations to participate in procedures for the award of
public contracts exclusively for specific health, social and cultural services
listed in the first paragraph of the same provision, with reference to their
specific CPV codes.204 This possibility again was not foreseen in the
197. It is therefore submitted that A.G.Wahl, in his Opinion in Case C-113/13, ASL 5
Spezzinowas wrong to refer to the new Directive as an additional argument to demonstrate that
all ambulance services fall under the scope of the public procurement directives (para 40).
198. See infra, section 5.
199. Parallel provisions are present in the other directives: see Craven, op. cit. supra note
132, 188 et seq.
200. See Rec. 113; see also the analysis by Smith, “Articles 74 to 76 of the Public
Procurement Directive: the new ‘light regime’ for social, health and other services and a new
category of reserved contracts for certain social, health and cultural services contracts”, 22
PPLR (2014), 160.
201. Schwab and Giesemann, “Mit mehr Regeln zu mehr Rechtssicherheit? Die
Überarbeitung des europäischen Vergaberechts” (2014) Vergaberecht, 357 et seq.
202. Gormley, op. cit. supra note 135, 177.
203. See also Rec. 115 et seq. of Dir. 2014/24, and Rec. 121 et seq. of Dir. 2014/25.
204. See also Rec. 120 as to how these references must be read; see also Smith, op. cit.
supra note 200, at 167 et seq.
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Commission proposal, but was added at the eleventh hour. According to
Recital 118 this derogation is justified by the need to ensure the continuity of
public services. This is not easy to understand, since the distinction between
for profit and non-for profit organizations could hardly be considered relevant
when assessing the reliability of the service provider. The legislative history
tells us that the UK insisted on this set aside regime to benefit organizations
set up by former employees of the contracting authorities, thus possibly
making externalization processes less contentious.205 However, this still does
not by itself ensure the continuity of public services since legally speaking the
contract has to be put for tender and could well be awarded to a different
organization.A logical conclusion is that the real reason for having this regime
has not been explained in the recitals, Recital 118 being simply misleading,
and the limit to new direct awards, while running counter to what the recital
says, must be an element in the compromise the Commission was ready to
accept when pushed by the Council.
Finally, in a number of instances, the political institutions have flouted, or
simply disregarded, the most fundamental principles of the EU Treaty in order
to win some points with domestic audiences or to push back unwelcome
scrutiny.
The first situation is illustrated by the treatment of concessions in the water
sector. There is a significant resistance to the privatization of water services in
some Member States and in some political quarters.206 In fact, the first
successful European citizens’ initiative was a petition on water.207 As was
shown above, the public contract directives are not about privatization.
Moreover, Articles 2 and 4 of Directive 2014/23, as added during the
legislative process, go out of their way to stress the freedom of Member States
to organize themselves and the way services of general economic interest are
provided to the public. This was not enough to satisfy water rights proponents,
and in the last stage of the legislative processes the Commission agreed to
exclude water from the concessions directive.208 Article 12 of Directive
2014/23 now foresees specific exclusion in the field of water because, as
Recital 40 now puts it, “concessions in the water sector are often subject to
specific and complex arrangements which require a particular consideration
205. See also Smith, op. cit. supra note 200, 167.
206. Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, para 1.47; Craven, op. cit. supra note 132, 191 et seq.
207. <ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/finalised/details/2012/000003>
(last visited 28 Nov. 2014); see Thielbörger, The Right(s) to Water (Springer, 2014), p. 33 et seq.
208. <ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/barnier/docs/speeches/20130621_water-out-
of-concessions-directive_en.pdf> (last visited 28 Nov. 2014); the document betrays evident
frustration at making the legal position clear to people who just do not want to listen.
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given the importance of water as a public good of fundamental value to all
Union citizens”.209
The provision may well have a placebo effect, but it will not change the
regime of water concession. If a contracting authority decides to outsource its
water services and the ensuing contract has a cross-border interest, that
authority will still have to comply with the general principles of the TFEU,
meaning it will have to devise an award procedure which is broadly speaking
the same as if it had to comply with Article 30 of Directive 2014/23. When the
Commission in 2019 reports to the Parliament and the Council on the
economic effects on the internal market of the exclusions set out in Article 12,
taking into account the specific structures of the water sector, as required
under Article 53 of Directive 2014/23, it will probably have found out that the
effects are very limited insofar as the general principles are indeed respected.
It will also probably report that negative effects flows from the additional legal
uncertainty coming from the exclusion brought in Article 12.210
The disregard for the fundamental rights and principles enshrined in the
Treaty is epitomized by Recital 78 of Directive 2014/24, added during
the legislative process at the insistence of the Council, under which: “The
contracting authority should have a duty to consider the appropriateness of
dividing contracts into lots while remaining free to decide autonomously on
the basis of any reason it deems relevant, without being subject to
administrative or judicial supervision”. Besides the (un)suitability of having
recitals masquerading as provisions, the safeguards of the general principle of
effective judicial protection proclaimed by the case law, by Article 47 of the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and now by Article 19(1) TEU cannot be
obliterated by secondary legislation to satisfy the whims of some Member
States.
4. The scope of EU public contract law following the reform
As already recalled when writing about service concessions, the
re-codification of EU public contracts law has also impacted on the scope of
application of the directives. This has been principally done in two different
ways: by directly changing the scope of application of EU legal rules and by
clarifying the law as to that scope. Moreover, the new directives make further
inroads into the implementation of contracts.
209. See also Rec. 84.
210. See Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, paras. 1.47 and 1.82.
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4.1. Service concessions, services of general interest, and service
procurements
From the former point of view, the most significant innovation is the adoption
of a directive specifically dedicated to concession contracts. Works
concessions had been regulated since Directive 89/440/EEC.211 The Member
States had however so far rebuffed the attempts by the Commission to bring
service concessions within the scope of EU secondary law.212 Evolving
institutional dynamics led to the enactment of Directive 2014/23 on the award
of concession contracts (both works and services) by both contracting
authorities and contracting entities.213
While the need and suitability of having a separate legal instrument specific
to concessions has been challenged,214 those contracts have specific
characteristics such as high value (which also means they are of cross-border
interest), long duration and the related necessity of adjustments from time to
time of the relevant contract terms, which certainly make it necessary to have
some rules which are somewhat different from those applicable to
procurement contracts.215 In principle, the regime of award procedures laid
down in Directive 2014/23 leaves more freedom of choice to contracting
authorities.216 It has however been rightly stressed that the characteristics of
concessions require enhanced flexibility in the management phase, while the
case for more flexible procedures is dubious to say the least.217
The need to rethink the rules on concessions also arose because of
uncertainties around the definition of a concession.218 The old directives
focused the notion of concession on the right of the concessionaire to exploit
the works or services. This was in due time translated by the case law into the
211. See Art. 56 of Dir. 2004/18/EC.
212. See Noguellou, “Scope and coverage of the EU procurement Directives” in Trybus,
Caranta and Edelstam, op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 30 et seq.; Pommer, “Public Private
Partnerships”, in ibid. at p. 300 et seq.; Risvig Hansen, op. cit. supra note 73, 121 et seq; Drijber
and Stergiou, op. cit. supra note 5, at 74 et seq.
213. See also supra section 3.1; see generally Neergaard, op. cit. supra note 131, at 387;
Risvig Hansen, op. cit. supra note 73, esp. 98 et seq; Burnett, op. cit. supra note 10, 1–18, and
Craven, op. cit. supra note 132,188–200.
214. E.g. Sanchez Graells, op. cit. supra note 21, at 95 et seq.
215. See again Sanchez Graells, op. cit. supra note 21, at 96 et seq; Burnett, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 6 et seq.
216. See infra in this section.
217. Burnett, op. cit. supra note 10, at 7 et seq.
218. See also Rec. 18 of Dir. 2014/23; see Risvig Hansen, “Defining a service concession
contract: Will the proposed new definition of service concessions contracts increase legal
certainty in the field of concessions?” in Ølykke, Risvig and Tvarnø, op. cit. supra note 1, at
p. 237 et seq.; see also Craven, op. cit. supra note 132, 192 et seq.
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existence of an exploitation risk.219 The ECJ however then somehow – and to
what extent is debatable – retraced it steps.The contract at issue inEurawasser
concerned the distribution of drinking water and the disposal of sewage.220
On account of the application of the rules governing the sector concerned, the
supply of this service normally involves very limited financial risks, even in
the event that that service is provided by the contracting authority. Somewhat
surprisingly, the ECJ rejected the argument that it is necessary that the risk
transferred to the concession holder be a significant risk. According to the
Court, it is not unusual that certain sectors of activity, in particular sectors
involving public service utilities, are subject to rules “which may have the
effect of limiting the financial risks entailed”.221 In such a case, it would be
enough that the contracting authority transfers to the concession holder “all, or
at least a significant share, of the operating risk which it faces, in order for a
service concession to be found to exist”.222
In the end, we could have a concession when a significant share of a very
limited – possibly insignificant one could think – risk was transferred. This
approach was affirmed inNorma-Awhich also reiterated the indications from
a (then) recent preceeding judgment as to the relevant risks.223 According to
the ECJ, the risk linked to such an operation must be understood as the risk of
exposure to the vagaries of the market “which may, in particular, consist in the
risk of competition from other operators, the risk that supply of the services
will not match demand, the risk that those liable will be unable to pay for the
services provided, the risk that the costs of operating the services will not be
met by revenue or also the risk of liability for harm or damage resulting from
an inadequacy of the service”.224 Risks such as those linked to bad
management or errors of judgment by the economic operator, however, are
inherent in every contract, whether it be a public service contract or a service
concession.225
Article 5(1) of Directive 2014/23 is expected to reinstate a more rigorous
understanding of “risk”. Not only is demand or supply risk or both transferred
to the concessionaire,226 but also “[t]he concessionaire shall be deemed to
219. Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen, para 40; see also Case C-234/03, Contse and Others,
EU:C:2005:644, para 22.
220. Case C-206/08, Eurawasser, EU:C:2009:540.
221. Ibid., para 72.
222. Ibid., para 77; see also Case C274/09, Privater Rettungsdienst und Krankentransport
Stadler, EU:C:2011:130, para 33 et seq.
223. Case C-348/10,Norma-A SIA, EU:C:2011:721; see the analysis by Risvig Hansen, op.
cit. supra note 218, at 241 et seq.; the precedent is Case C-274/09, Privater Rettungsdienst und
Krankentransport Stadler.
224. Case C-348/10, Norma-A SIA, para 48.
225. Ibid., para 49.
226. See also Rec. 20.
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assume operating risk where, under normal operating conditions, it is not
guaranteed to recoup the investments made or the costs incurred in operating
the works or the services which are the subject-matter of the concession. The
part of the risk transferred to the concessionaire shall involve real exposure to
the vagaries of the market, such that any potential estimated loss incurred by
the concessionaire shall not be merely nominal or negligible.” It would seem
therefore that when the applicable legislation insulates the service provider
from all significant risk, only a procurement contract may be awarded.227 This
makes sense considering that the thresholds for service procurement and
concessions are very different, and the procedures for awarding the latter
much less structured, so that contracting authorities might too easily be
tempted to award concessions.228
As recalled, while the new directives were widening the scope of EU
secondary law to cover service concessions, they were also buttressing the
freedom of the Member States in deciding how to organize themselves both
generally and with specific reference to the provision of services of general
interest (SGIs), and services of general economic interest (SGEIs) in
particular.229
Unsurprisingly this is particularly explicit in Directive 2014/23. A whole
series of provisions were added during the legislative process. In describing
the scope of the Directive, Article 1(4) provides that agreements, decisions or
other legal instruments that organize the transfer of powers and
responsibilities for the performance of public tasks between contracting
authorities (or entities) or groupings of contracting authorities (or entities),
and which do not provide for remuneration to be given for contractual
performance, are considered to be a matter of internal organization of the
Member State concerned and, as such, are not affected in any way by the
Directive.
This provision lays the ground for the rules on in-house and public-public
co-operation which are discussed below.230 Article 2 of Directive 2014/23
introduces in quite sweeping terms the “principle of free administration by
public authorities”. National, regional and local authorities are to be “free to
decide how best to manage the execution of works or the provision of services,
to ensure in particular a high level of quality, safety and affordability, equal
treatment and the promotion of universal access and of user rights in public
227. See also Rec. 19. It has however been pointed out that the new Directive, which did not
keep the requirement of a substantial risk transfer which was present in the proposal, still leaves
a number of question marks: Burnett, op. cit. supra note 10, at 10 et seq.; also because of the
absence of a definition of “operating risk”: Craven, op. cit. supra note 132, 193.
228. See Burnett, op. cit. supra note 10, at 13 et seq.
229. Ibid., at 10 et seq.
230. Infra section 4.4.
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services”. More specifically, those authorities “may choose to perform their
public interest tasks with their own resources, or in cooperation with other
authorities or to confer them upon economic operators”. Contextualizing the
traditional rule now found in Article 345 TFEU, Article 2(2) further states that
the Directive neither affects the systems of property ownership set out in
national law nor requires the privatization of public enterprises providing
services to the public. Again this translates into clarifying that in-house
arrangements are perfectly fine under EU public contracts law.231
Article 4 of Directive 2014/23 is specifically dedicated to the “Freedom to
define services of general economic interest”. It provides that the Directive
leaves unaffected “the freedom of Member States to define, in conformity
with Union law, what they consider to be services of general economic
interest, how those services should be organized and financed, in compliance
with the State aid rules, and what specific obligations they should be subject
to”. The same principle is reiterated with reference to the organization of
social security systems. Basically again the Member States may decide
whether to provide SGEIs directly through their services or to outsource them.
EU public contract law will only apply if the second option is chosen. The
reference to State aid rules is of great relevance since the legal act entrusting
a SGEI may “take the form of a legislative or regulatory instrument or a
contract”.232 This is confirmed by Recital 5 of Directive 2014/24 which
reassures the Member States that nothing in the Directive obliges them to
contract out or externalize the provision of services that they wish to provide
themselves or to organize by means other than public contracts; more
specifically, the provision of services based on laws, regulations or
employment contracts is not covered.233 The correct qualification of the legal
act involved may well be problematic, nevertheless, and open to abuses, with
the Member States possibly being tempted to use legislative measures instead
of contracts to try to evade the application of EU public procurement law.234
231. See also Rec. 5 of Dir. 2014/24 and Rec. 7 of Dir. 2014/25.
232. Communication from the Commission On the application of the European Union State
aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of SGEI (2012/C 8/02), point 33; see more
generally Neergaard, “Services of General (Economic) Interest and the services Directive” in
Neergaard, Nielsen, Roseberry (Eds.), The Services Directive (DJØF, 2008), at p. 84 et seq.;
Ølykke, “The definition of a ‘contract’ under Article 106 TFEU” in Szyszczak et al. (Eds.),
Developments in Services of General Interest (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2011), at p.113 et seq.;
Fiedziuk, “Putting Services of General Economic Interest up for tender: Reflection on
applicable EU rules”, 50 CML Rev. (2013), at 99 et seq.
233. See also Rec. 6 of Dir. 2014/23; one example seems to be Case C-532/03,Commission
v Ireland, EU:C:2007:801; Brown, op. cit. supra note 192, NA92.
234. See Neergaard, op. cit. supra note 131, at p. 397; cf. also the discussion in Caranta,
“General Report” in Neergaard, Jacqueson and Ølykke (Eds.), Public Procurement Law:
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The Concessions Directive goes some way in reiterating the division of
tasks between EU institutions and Member States which is articulated in
Article 14 TFEU and Protocol No 26 annexed to the TFEU and to the Treaty
on European Union. Moreover, non-economic services of general interest are
expressly said to fall outside the scope of the Directive by Article 4(2).235
Without proclaiming freedoms for the Member States, Article 1(4) to (6) of
Directive 2014/24 are very much drafted along the same lines.236
The coverage of the new Concessions Directive could have been wider.
Institutional public private partnerships fall outside its scope; contracting
authorities will continue to refer to the soft law guidance provided by the
Commission in its Communication on the application of Community law on
public procurement and concessions to institutionalized public-private
partnership.237
Parallel evolutions in the case law also led to the demise of the traditional
distinction between priority and non-priority service procurement238 such as
hotel and restaurant services and legal services.239 The old “non-priority
services” have not however been brought under the full rigour of the Directive.
Some have become excluded services. Article 10 of the Directive has a much
longer and more articulated list of excluded service contracts as compared to
Article 16 of Directive 2004/18/EC: “[a] motley collection of services enjoy
exclusion from the directives, with justifications ranging from the obvious to
the obscure”.240 Most of the former “non-priority services” have migrated to
a new regime for social and other special services laid down by Article 75 et
seq. of Directive 2014/24 (referred to above).241
4.2. The definition of procurement contract
The scope of application of EU secondary public procurement law has also
been somewhat clarified.242 As Recital 4 of 2014/24 indicates: “The
increasingly diverse forms of public action have made it necessary to define
more clearly the notion of procurement itself ”. According to the same recital,
the new provisions are however not intended to go beyond a clarification and,
Limitations, Opportunities and Paradoxes – The XXVI FIDE Congress Publications, vol. 3
(FIDE/DJØF, 2014), at 87 et seq.
235. See also Rec. 6 of Dir. 2014/23.
236. See also Rec. 5 and Rec. 6 of Dir. 2014/24, and Art. 1(4) to (6) of Dir. 2014/25.
237. COM(2007)6661 final.
238. Cf. Caranta, op. cit. supra note 188, 82 et seq.
239. See Art. 23 of Dir. 2004/18/EC; see Risvig Hansen, op. cit. supra note 73, at 111 et seq.
240. Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, at para 1.24.
241. Infra section 4.4.
242. Cf. also Caranta, op. cit. supra note 188, 68 et seq.
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as such, they should “not broaden the scope of this Directive compared to that
of Directive 2004/18/EC”. This is easier said than done, but indicates that
Member States very much resent a case law which is perceived as creating
new obligations.243
Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 2004/18 defined “public contracts” as
“contracts for pecuniary interest concluded in writing between one or more
economic operators and one or more contracting authorities and having as
their object the execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of
services”. “Concessions” were defined along much the same lines by Article
1(3) and (4) with the difference that the consideration for the works to be
carried out or the services to be provided consists either solely in the right to
exploit the work or service or in this right together with payment.244
The actual meaning of the provision defining “public contracts” was
litigated in a number of cases.245 Helmut Müller concerned a somewhat
complex arrangement.246 The German federal agency responsible for
managing public property (Bundesanstalt) put up for sale some land which
the purchaser was to develop in conformity with the urban-planning
objectives of the competent local authority. The buyer was chosen by the
federal agency in agreement with the municipality and the choice was
challenged on the ground that public procurement rules had not been
followed. The ECJ remarked first of all that the sale by a public authority of
undeveloped land or land which has already been built upon does not
constitute a public works contract within the meaning of Article 1(2)(b) of
Directive 2004/18. Indeed, such a contract requires that the public authority
assume the “position of purchaser and not seller”.247
As to the relationship between the public authority (with town-planning
powers) and the purchaser of the land, the ECJ held that the Directive covers
contracts for pecuniary interest and “does not refer to other types of activities
for which public authorities are responsible”.248 This means that to have a
public contract, it is required that the contracting authority which has
concluded a public contract – or members of the public in the pursuance of
whose interests the contracting authority has acted249 – “receives a service
243. See also for further references Eleftheriadis, “Planning agreements as public contracts
under EU procurement rules”, (2011) PPLR, at 49 et seq.
244. See Noguellou, op. cit. supra note 212, at 24 et seq.
245. Eleftheriadis, op. cit. supra note 243.
246. Case C-451/08, Helmut Müller, EU:C:2010:168.
247. Ibid., para 41.
248. Ibid., para 46.
249. Ibid., para 49.
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pursuant to that contract in return for consideration”.250 The exercise of
urban-planning powers does not have the purpose of obtaining a contractual
service.251 Moreover, the mere fact that a public authority, in the exercise of its
urban-planning powers, examines certain building plans presented to it, or
takes a decision applying its powers in that sphere, does not satisfy the
condition that there are “requirements specified by the contracting authority”,
within the meaning of Article 1(2)(b) of Directive 2004/18/EC laying down
the definition of public works.252
More recently, in Libert, the Flemish legislation at issue imposed on
developers an obligation to build some social housing units in the framework
of wider land development projects. The ECJ held that the obligation referred
to the placement of these units on the market rather than the building of public
works and consequently ruled out the applicability of Directive 2004/18.253
Article 1(2) of Directive 2014/24 has introduced a new definition for
“procurement” in addition to the traditional definition of “public contracts”
which may still be found in what has become Article 2(5). Under Article 1(2),
procurement is “the acquisition by means of a public contract of works,
supplies or services by one or more contracting authorities from economic
operators chosen by those contracting authorities, whether or not the works,
supplies or services are intended for a public purpose”.254 The legislative
drafting technique here leaves much to be desired. The two provisions might
easily have been merged, and the distinction between “procurement” and
“public contract” is simply lost in most of the other language versions.
Moreover, “public contract” is clearly the genus, with “procurement” being
the species. The genus should have been defined first, with the specification
elements (in writing, acquisition, pecuniary interest, and so on) added at a
later stage.255
What is, however, important is that the definition of procurement brings an
additional requirement – “acquisition” – on top of the definition of public
contract. This means that, in line with Loutraki and Müller, the mere sale of
250. Ibid., para 48; this was followed in Case C-271/08, Commission v. Germany,
EU:C:2010:426, para 75; the requirement of “direct benefit” is however in itself problematic
since direct the beneficiary of public contracts is often the public at large: Caranta, op. cit. supra
note 234, at 96; see also Eleftheriadis, op. cit. supra note 243, at 51.
251. Case C-451/08, Helmut Müller, para 57.
252. Ibid., para 68.
253. Joined Cases C-197 & 203/11, Libert, EU:C:2013:288, para 114; the facts of the case
had however been insufficiently clarified by the referring court.
254. The Commission’s proposal had “purchase” instead of “acquisition”, which was in the
end rightly preferred; Rec. 4 further elaborates the notion of “acquisition”.
255. Please refer to Caranta, op. cit. supra note 188, 70 et seq.
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public property falls outside the scope of the Public Sector Directive.256 EU
State aids rules might instead be relevant.257
The new definition may help to bring some consistency in the case law.
Helmut Müller may indeed be distinguished from Auroux and Ordine degli
Architetti delle Province di Milano e Lodi which both involved some public
works meeting requirements laid down by the contracting authorities.258
Libert however remains somewhat problematic. Basically, developers were
“forced” to deliver affordable homes thus implementing a policy in the general
interest designed by the public authority granting the building permission. It is
however true that the authority did not provide any consideration, not even in
the form of a discount on the duties the developer had to pay, as instead was
the case in Ordine degli Architetti delle Province di Milano e Lodi,259 so the
pecuniary interest was probably lacking.260
The same might be true for infringement proceedings brought against Spain
because of the conclusion of development agreements in the Valencia
region.261 However, the ECJ decided the case on the finding that the
Commission failed to demonstrate that the public works which are indeed
among of the activities committed to the developer constituted the “main
object of the contract”.262 It is, however, hard to believe that building a theatre
shell was the main object of the contract concluded by the Municipality of
Milan and challenged in Ordine degli Architetti delle Province di Milano e
Lodi. Indeed, that building was but one small facet of a complex
redevelopment project affecting a major urban area. The ECJ is referring here
albeit in a truncated way to the mixed contract doctrine. This demonstrates the
difficulty inherent in developing the law through cases. When Auroux and
Ordine degli Architetti delle Province di Milano e Lodi were decided, the
mixed contracts doctrine had not yet been developed. Those cases would
probably have been decided differently if it had.
256. Joined Cases C-145 & 149/08, Club Hotel Loutraki, EU:C:2010:247; Case C-451/08,
Helmut Müller.
257. Commission Communication on State aid elements in sales of land and buildings by
public authorities (O.J. 1997, C 209/ 3).
258. Case C-220/05, Auroux and Others, EU:C:2007:31; Case C-399/98 Ordine degli
Architetti and Others, EU:C:2001:401.
259. Case C-399/98,Ordine degli Architetti and Others; this would also have distinguished
Libert from Case C-576/10, Commission v. the Netherlands, EU:C:2013:510, where however
the Court did not go into the qualification of the arrangement at issue.
260. Eleftheriadis, op. cit. supra note 243, at 44 et seq.
261. Case C-306/08, Commission v. Spain, EU:C:2011:347.
262. Ibid., para 96; see also Gimeno Feliú and Valcárcel Fernández, “Spain” in Neergaard,
Jacqueson and Ølykke, op. cit. supra note 234, at 713.
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4.3. Mixed contracts
The ECJ refined its doctrine of mixed contracts in Loutraki.263 At the root of
that case was a decision by the Greek Government to privatize a casino
through a mixed contract comprising a sale of shares aspect, services
(managing the casino) and works (refurbishment and development).264
According to the Court: “In the case of a mixed contract, the different aspects
of which are, in accordance with the contract notice, inseparably linked and
thus form an indivisible whole, the transaction at issue must be examined as a
whole for the purposes of its legal classification and must be assessed on the
basis of the rules which govern the aspect which constitutes the main object or
predominant feature of the contract.”265 Having considered the transaction at
issue as an inseparable whole,266 the Court found the privatization aspect to be
the prevailing one, with the works and services being ancillary to the main
object. As such, the contract could not be held to fall within the scope of the
directives on public contracts.267
Another mixed contract case was Mehiläinen Oy.268 Oulu City Council
decided to set up a joint venture with a private partner to provide occupational
health care and welfare services. The two partners intended activities to be
chiefly and increasingly focused on private clients. However, for a transitional
period of four years, they undertook to purchase from the joint venture the
health services they were required to provide for their staff. Unlike Loutraki,
this case turned on the severability of the different transactions involved in the
agreement. InMehiläinen Oy, the transitional arrangement was intended as a
parting gift to the new venture. According to the ECJ, however, this did not
mean that the services envisaged for the transitional period were not
263. Joined Cases C-145 & 149/08, Club Hotel Loutraki; an earlier case was Case
C-331/92, Gestión Hotelera Internacional, EU:C:1994:155, paras. 23 to 29.
264. Ibid., para 46 et seq.
265. Ibid., para 48.
266. Ibid., para 51 et seq; one could argue that the severability test was already present in
the case law: Case C-411/00, Felix Swoboda, EU:C:2002:660, para 57, referred to contracting
authorities artificially grouping in one contract services of different types: Tokár, “Institutional
Report” in Neergaard, Jacqueson and Ølykke, op. cit. supra note 234, at p. 189.
267. Joined Cases C-145 & 149/08, Club Hotel Loutraki, para 55 et seq; the Court also
refers to the Green Paper on public-private partnerships and Community law on public
contracts and concessions (COM(2004)327 final), where the Commission points out that it is
necessary to ensure that privatization does not in reality conceal the award to a private partner
of contracts which might be termed public contracts or concessions (which is held not to be the
case). As already recalled, only the “main object” criterion was used in Case C-306/08,
Commission v. Spain.
268. Case C-215/09,Mehiläinen Oy, EU:C:2010:807.
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severable. Quite the contrary: they could and should have been awarded
through a procurement procedure.269
Article 3 of Directive 2014/24 more or less codifies Loutraki.270 The
provision, however, is far from straightward – starting with the fact that it
bears a title referring to “mixed procurement” rather than “mixed contract”.271
In line with Loutraki,Article 3(3) introduces a different regime according to
whether the different parts of a given contract are objectively separable or
not.272 Recital 11 provides some guidance as to how operate the test to
distinguish the two situations.273 If the different parts of a given contract are
objectively not separable, Article 3(6) provides that “the applicable legal
regime shall be determined on the basis of the main subject-matter of that
contract”. This will mainly be relevant in case of objectively non-separable
mixed procurement and concession contract or mixed covered and excluded
procurement.274
There is no reason why the very general provision laid down in Article 3(6)
should not also apply by analogy to situations in which, as in Loutraki, one
part of the contract, and possibly the most relevant part, does not fall under any
EU public contract regime, in the sense that it is neither procurement (in either
the public or the utilities or the defence and security sectors) nor a
concession.275 This might be very relevant in situations where the contracting
authority is pursuing what were once called “secondary objectives”, and
especially social ones, as in the case of works procurements intended to
provide training and jobs to long term unemployed.276
What is important to stress is that contracting authorities are now expressly
empowered to shape complex contractual arrangements provided that this
does not translate into bringing the resulting contract outside the scope of
application of the Public Sector Directive. This brings us back to the
infringement proceedings against Spain. What is disturbing in the way the
case law is developed is that the ECJ reasoned along the lines of the mixed
269. Ibid., para 37 et seq.
270. See also Art. 20 of Dir. 2014/23.
271. Rec. 11 et seq. refer to “mixed contracts” instead. However, the French, German,
Italian, and Spanish versions all have the same word both in the Recitals and in the text of the
Directive (marché, Auftrag, appalti, contrato); see also Caranta, op. cit. supra note 188, 77 et
seq.
272. See also Art. 20(4) of Dir. 2014/23 and Art. 5(4) of Dir. 2014/25; for details, see
Caranta, op. cit. supra note 188, 78 et seq.
273. See also Rec. 29 of Dir. 2014/23, and Rec. 13 of Dir. 2014/25.
274. Specifically on mixes of concession contracts and supply contracts see also Art. 20(5)
of Dir. 2014/23.
275. Arrowsmith, op. cit. supra note 6, at 554.
276. Please refer to Caranta, op. cit. supra note 49, at 170 et seq.
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contract doctrine all the way, forgetting about the severability requirement,
which is one if its essential aspects.277
4.4. In-house contracts and public-public cooperation
Public procurement law is applicable when procuring authorities decide to
externalize some activity, production or other task. It is not applicable when a
procuring authority builds the works, or provides the goods and the services
needed with its own means, according to the freedom of organization it is
granted by the Treaty.278 In certain situations, procuring authorities, while not
strictly speaking producing the works, goods and services they need
themselves, have recourse to entities which cannot be said to be completely
distinct from them. In these cases, the procuring entities are not procuring
what they need from the market; as such, public procurement rules should not
apply. The problem is to find out exactly when this happens.279
The leading case on in-house is Teckal, a case concerning the award of
service concessions.280 Starting from the notion of contract as an agreement
between two separate persons, the Court held that, for EU procurement law to
apply:
“it is, in principle, sufficient if the contract was concluded between, on the
one hand, a local authority and, on the other, a person legally distinct from
that local authority. The position can be otherwise only in the case where
the local authority exercises over the person concerned a control which is
similar to that which it exercises over its own departments and, at the same
277. Case C-306/08, Commission v. Spain.
278. See the Opinion of A.G. Geelhoed in Case C-295/05, Asemfo, EU:C:2006:619, para
49; see also Rec. 5, Rec. 6 and Art. 2 of Dir. 2014/23 and Rec. 5 and Art. 1(4) of Dir. 2014/24;
also the Commission Staff Working paper Concerning the Application of EU Public
Procurement Law to Relations between Contracting Authorities SEC(2011)1169 final.
279. Burgi, “Contracting authorities, in-house services and public authorities cooperation”
in Lichère, Caranta and Treumer, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 49 et seq; Janssen, “The
institutionalised and non-institutionalise exemptions from EU public procurement law:
Towards a more coherent approach?”, (2014) Utrecht Law review, 168. Before the new
directives see the contributions collected in Comba and Treumer (Eds.), The In-House
Providing in European Law (DJØF, 2010); Cavallo Perin and Casalini, “Control over in-house
providing organisations”, (2009) PPLR, at 239; Pernas Garcías, Las operaciones in house y el
Derecho comunitario de contratos públicos (Madrid, 2008); Avarkioti, “The application of EU
public procurement rules to ‘in-house’ arrangements”, (2007) PPLR, 22; Weltzein, “Avoiding
the procurement rules by awarding contracts to in-house entity: The Scope of the Procurement
Directives in the Classical Sector”, (2005) PPLR, 252.
280. Case C-107/98, Teckal, EU:C:1999:562; see Tokár, op. cit. supra note 266, at 185 et
seq. The background and aftermath of the case are analysed by Comba, “In-house providing in
Italy: The circulation of a model” in Comba and Treumer, op. cit. supra note 147, at p. 101
et seq.
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time, that person carries out the essential part of its activities with the
controlling local authority or authorities.”281
The subsequent case law has refined the requirements of legitimate in-house
providing, holding that (i) private participation in the capital of the controlled
entity rules out in-house,282 (ii) the “similar” control may be exercised jointly
by several contracting authorities,283 and (iii) the activities performed by the
joint entity must essentially be addressed to the contracting authority(ies)
exercising control considered together.284 The case law makes it clear that the
doctrine of in-house providing constitutes an exception to the rule that public
contracts are awarded following competitive procedures. As such it must be
read narrowly.285 French authors talk of “une notion à la portée presque
fantomatique”.286
The case law has been codified with some adjustments and additions287 in
Article 12 of Directive 2014/24, which builds on the freedom of organization
granted to Member States under Article 1(4) to (6).288 After some tug-of-war
between the Commission and the Member States, Article 12(1) set at 80
percent the “essential part” of the activities which are to be carried out “in the
performance of tasks entrusted to it by the controlling contracting authority”.
This leaves in-house entities a considerable margin for market activities which
might be seen as distorting competition because of the risk they are
cross-subsidized with the revenues generated by in-house operations. The
issue is not confined to in-house providing but also arises with reference to the
market activity of public law entities. In Data Medical Service, the ECJ
referred to the aim of attaining the widest possible opening-up to competition
as the reason to preclude automatic exclusion of some categories of market
281. Case C-107/98, Teckal, para 50.
282. The leading case is Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau, para 49; see also Case
C-324/07, Coditel Brabant, para 30, and Case C-573/07, Sea, EU:C:2009:532, para 46.
283. Case C-324/07, Coditel Brabant, para 45; see also Joined Cases C-182 & 183/11,
Econord, EU:C:2012:758, para 28 et seq.; see Noguellou, op. cit. supra note 212, at 20 et seq.
For specific arrangements meeting this requirement see also Kindl, Ráz, Hubková, Pavelka
“Czech Republic”, Németh, “Hungary”, and Sołtysin´ska, “Poland”, all in Neergaard,
Jacqueson and Ølykke, op. cit. supra note 234, at p. 283 et seq., 482, 653 et seq.
284. Case C-295/05, Asociación Nacional de Empresas Forestales, EU:C:2007:227, para
57.
285. Kaarresalo, “Procuring in-house: The impact of the EC procurement regime”, (2008)
PPLR, 254.
286. Pilone, “Réflexions autour de la notion de contrat ‘in house’” in Contrats publics.
Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Michel Guibal (Presses de la Faculté de droit de
Montpellier, 2006), p. 712.
287. For a different assessment see however Janssen, op. cit. supra note 279, at 170; but see
also at 179.
288. See also Art. 17 of Dir. 2014/23 and Rec. 45 thereof.
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operators from taking part in public procurement procedures.289 The rules on
abnormally low tenders must instead be used to police possible abuses leading
to market distortions.290
At the instance of the European Parliament, Article 12(1) also allows for
some private participation in the in-house entity under very specific
conditions.291 Article 12(2) provides for horizontal in-house, with all
participants in an in-house group allowed to contract directly with other
participants.292 Article 12(3) specifies the rules applicable to in-house entities
jointly controlled by a plurality of contracting authorities, adapting the Teckal
criteria to this situation.293 The specific provision allowing one person to
“represent several or all of the participating contracting authorities” will allow
control also in cases of minimal participation in the capital of the in-house
entities, something that would have seemed close to impossible in the wake of
Econord.294
The in-house case law spun off a second line of cases concerning
partnership agreements between contracting authorities which do not entail
the setting up of a common – possibly in-house – entity.295 The leading case
stems from infringement proceedings against Germany concerning the waste
disposal arrangement concluded by the City-State of Hamburg and four
adjoining Landkreise.296 Hamburg was to build a new incineration facility
intended to produce both electricity and heat. It reserved a third of the overall
capacity of the facility for the four Landkreise, for a price calculated using the
same formula for each of the parties concerned. The price was to be paid to the
facility’s operator.297 The Commission brought proceedings against Germany
for its failure to have a call for tenders in the context of a formal tendering
procedure. The ECJ accepted that the four Landkreise concerned did not
exercise any “similar” control either over the other contracting party,
Hamburg City-State, or over the operator of the waste incineration facility,
289. Case C-568/13, Data Medical Service, EU:C:2014:2466, para 34.
290. Ibid., paras. 46 et seq.
291. See also Rec. 32; this has to be read restrictively, as the case law is quite strict on this
point: Case C-574/12, Centro Hospitalar de Setúbal and SUCH, EU:C:2014:2004, para 37 et
seq.
292. The problem was discussed by Casalini, “Beyond EU law” in Ølykke, Risvig and
Tvarnø, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 174 et seq.; see also Burgi and Koch, “In-house procurement
and horizontal cooperation between public authorities”, 7 EPPPL (2012), 86.
293. Case C-324/07, Coditel Brabant, is the main source for this sub-paragraph; contrast
Case C-15/13, Datenlotsen Informationssysteme, EU:C:2014:303, para 31 et seq.; see also
Janssen, op. cit. supra note 279, at 173 et seq.
294. Joined Cases C-182 & 183/11, Econord, para 31 et seq.
295. See Burgi, op. cit. supra note 279, 59 et seq.
296. Case C-480/06, Commission v. Germany, EU:C:2009:357.
297. While the details may change, similar arrangements are widespread: e.g. Poulsen,
“Denmark” in Neergaard, Jacqueson and Ølykke, op. cit. supra note 234, at 310 et seq.
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which is a company whose capital consists in part of private funds.298
Considering, however, that the infringement proceedings only concerned the
contract between Hamburg and the four neighbouring Landkreise for
reciprocal treatment of waste, and not the contract governing the relationship
between the city and the operator of the waste treatment facility, the Court held
that the contract at issue established a form of cooperation between local
authorities with the aim of ensuring that a public task that they all have to
perform is carried out.299
Unlike with in-house provision, the ECJ never spelt out a list of
requirements defining public-public cooperation.300 In ASL Lecce, the Lecce
branch of the national health service had concluded with the local University
a consultancy contract relating to the study and evaluation of the seismic
vulnerability of its hospital buildings.301 Referring to the Hamburg waste
case, the ECJ affirmed the principle that public cooperation agreements fall
outside the province of EU public contract law provided inter alia that the
“cooperation is governed solely by considerations and requirements relating
to the pursuit of objectives in the public interest”.302 According to the Court,
the agreement at issue contained a series of substantive aspects, a significant
or even major part of which corresponded to activities usually carried out by
engineers and architects and which, even though they have an academic
foundation, did not however constitute academic research. In consequence,
the contract did not appear to ensure the implementation of a public task
which the ASL and the University both had to perform.303 Moreover, the
agreement allowed the University to have recourse to “highly qualified
external collaborators”, possibly including private service providers, who
would therefore end up benefiting from a public service contract without
going through a competitive award procedure.304 The latter aspect was
possibly what pushed the ECJ to decide that the agreement was not a genuine
298. Case C-480/06, Commission v. Germany, para 33.
299. Ibid., para 38; see also Treumer, “In-house providing in Danemark” in Comba and
Treumer (Eds.), The In-House Providing in European Law (DJØF, 2010), at p. 174 et seq.
Ølykke, op. cit. supra note 232, at 116 et seq. reads the case in the context of entrustment of
SGEIs
300. See Opinion of A.G. Trstenjak in Case C-159/11, ASL Lecce, EU:C:2012:303, para 66
et seq., proposing her own list of criteria; see also Casalini, op. cit. supra note 292, at 174 et seq.
301. Case C-159/11, ASL Lecce, EU:C:2012:817; the case was followed in Case C-564/11,
Consulta Regionale Ordine Ingegneri della Lombardia, EU:C:2013:307, in which a notice had
been published, but participation was reserved to universities; the ECJ did not elaborate on this
aspect since the referring court had not asked about it. It was also followed in Case C-352/12,
Consiglio Nazionale degli Ingegneri, EU:C:2013:416, a case where a negotiated procedure
would have probably be possible under Art. 31 Dir. 2004/18/EC.
302. Case C-159/11, ASL Lecce, para 35.
303. Ibid., para 37.
304. Ibid., para 39.
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form of public-public cooperation.A fortiori public public-cooperation will be
excluded when there is a private capital participation in any one of the
participants to the agreement.305
It is however also possible that under EU law, as restated in ASL Lecce,
cooperation agreements are possible only with reference to a common public
task that those entities all have to perform.306 That would be unduly restrictive,
since different public authorities may well pursue different general interests
without this making cooperation between them less sensible. A different
distinction runs between public law missions and commercial activities.307
The real issue in ASL Lecce was that the University was not pursuing a public
law mission; it was engaged in a legitimate commercial activity which, like in
CoNISMa, should have been channelled through public procurement rather
than benefit from direct award.308
This analysis is confirmed by the more recent Piepenbrock case.309 One
contracting authority had entrusted another with the task of cleaning certain
office, administrative and school buildings; the second company discharged
its obligation through a private service provider which was already cleaning
its offices. The ECJ found that no genuine cooperation between the
contracting public entities was established in this case.310 Again the cleaning
services at stake in Piepenbrock are commercial in nature and do not amount
to public service missions.311 Moreover, an economic operator (the one
already providing the services to the contracting authority being asked to
provide the services) gets an advantage over its competitors by becoming the
beneficiary of a direct award.312
The distinction between public law missions and commercial activities is
not in itself entirely devoid of problems. This would seem to rule out the
legality of a number of instances of cooperation concerning the provision of
305. As happened in the Czech case discussed by Kindl et al., and Németh, and Sołtysin´ska,
all op. cit. supra note 283, at p. 283 et seq.
306. See also Case C-159/11, ASL Lecce, para 40; on the same lines: the Order in Case
C-564/11, Ingegneri della Lombardia, para 35; and Case C-352/12, Consiglio Nazionale degli
Ingegneri, para 43; the requirement of the discharge of a common public task is deduced from
the idea of cooperation by A.G. Trstenjak: Case C-159/11, ASL Lecce, para 76 et seq. of the
Opinion.
307. See the discussion by Ølykke, op. cit. supra note 232, at 118 et seq.; Ferk and Ferk,
“Slovenia” in Neergaard, Jacqueson and Ølykke, op. cit. supra note 234, at p. 690, rather refer
to the distinction between economic and non-economic activities; this would however exclude
public cooperation in the area of SGEIs.
308. Case C-305/08, CoNISMa, EU:C:2009:807.
309. Case C-386/11 Piepenbrock Dienstleistungen GmbH & Co. KG, EU:C:2013:385.
310. Ibid., para 39 et seq.
311. Caranta, op. cit. supra note 188, 109 et seq; see also Arrowsmith, op. cit. supra note 6,
523.
312. See also the analysis by Tokár, op. cit. supra note 266, at 187 et seq.
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back-office services, such as IT support, which do not take the permitted
forms of central purchasing arrangements because no recourse is had to the
market, but which may still be present in some Member States.313
In the end, what is unclear from the case law on public-public cooperation is
whether the legality of direct awards implied in such agreements is ruled out a)
unless the cooperation is set up to perform a common task, and provided that
no market participants get a competitive advantage from the agreement, or b)
unless the cooperation is set up to perform a public law mission devoid of
commercial nature, and provided that no market participants get a competitive
advantage from the agreement, or simply c) when no market participants get a
competitive advantage from the agreement. These alternatives place very
different constraints on the organization freedom of contracting authorities
and the Member States.314 The real issue for EU law should be to make sure
that public-public cooperation does not result in one private economic
operator being placed in a position of advantage vis-à-vis its competitors.315
Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/24 now specifically focuses on
public-public cooperation. It lays down three conditions which must be
cumulatively met. The first is that the cooperation must ensure that “public
services they have to perform are provided with a view to achieving objectives
they have in common”. The requirement seems to fall short of a common task
(“public services”), and therefore the strictest reading of the case law that was
discussed above would be wrong. This is confirmed by Recital 33, according
to which “the services provided by the various participating authorities need
not necessarily be identical; they might also be complementary”.316 The issue
will obviously be the meaning of “complementary”. The second condition
requires the implementation of the cooperation to be solely governed by
considerations relating to the public interest; one could be excused for
thinking: ça va de soi, since we are talking about public services.317 The third
condition however is clearly aimed at restricting the cooperation, since it
requires that “the participating contracting authorities perform on the open
market less than 20% of the activities concerned by the cooperation”.318
Besides being restrictive, this does not seem to have much to do with either
313. E.g. Van de Meent and Manunza, “The Netherlands” in Neergaard, Jacqueson and
Ølykke, op. cit. supra note 234, at 614.
314. See also Burgi, op. cit. supra note 279, 62 et seq.
315. Rec. 31 of Dir. 2014/24.
316. Also refer to Arrowsmith, op. cit. supra note 6, at 527.
317. See also Rec. 33, on the “cooperative” concept.
318. See the discussion by Sestier, “Les nouvelles dispositions relatives aux relations ‘in
house’ et aux coopérations ‘public/public’”, (2014) Bulletin Juridique des Contrats Publics, at
176 et seq.; this is considered not to be restrictive enough on competition grounds by Sanchez
Graells, Public procurement and the EU Competition rules, 2nd ed. (Hart, 2015 forthcoming),
ch. 6.
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ASL Lecce or Piepenbrock.319 The involvement of private market participants
is not expressly considered in the provision, the whole problem boiling down
to the question whether the contracting authorities concerned have – or have
not – a significant activity on the open market.320 On this basis it would seem
that ASL Lecce should be decided differently today, since neither the ASL nor
the University have such a significant market presence. This is of course
assuming that, focusing on the same situation, the case law and the provision
cannot coexist. Piepenbrock is more problematic, since in that case there was
a significant change in the procurement contract concluded between one of
the authorities and a market operator – which probably goes beyond what is
permissible under Article 72 of Directive 2014/24; moreover the market
operator had to agree. Public-public cooperation instead only involves
contracting authorities.321 Seen from another angle, one authority was acting
as a central purchasing body, without however complying with the rules
provided for this case.322
4.5. Licences, authorizations and similar
According to the more recent case law – focusing on licences for horse-race
betting operations – the award of “simple authorization schemes” falls outside
from the scope of application of EU public contract law.323 It is questionable
whether this links with the public procurement case law based on Article 51
TFEU. Under this provision, the rules relating to the freedom of establishment
and the freedom to provide services do not extend to activities which in a
Member State are connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official
authority. As a consequence, according to this case law, such activities are also
excluded from the scope of public procurement directives which are designed
to implement the provisions of the Treaty relating to the freedom of
establishment and the freedom to provide services.324 On the one hand, the
distinction between contracts and authoritative measures does not always run
according to substantive requirements, the ECJ often being happy with the
319. Case C-159/11, ASL Lecce; Case C386/11, Piepenbrock Dienstleistungen GmbH &
Co. KG.
320. See however Rec. 33.
321. See Rec. 33.
322. See the discussion in Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, para 1.59, and Wollenschläger
“Deutschland” in Neergaard, Jacqueson and Ølykke, op. cit. supra note 234, p. 404 et seq.
323. Case C-203/08, Sporting Exchange, EU:C:2010:307; Case C470/11, Garkalns SIA,
EU:C:2012:505; see the discussion in Ølykke, “Is the granting of special and exclusive rights
subject to the principles applicable to the award of concessions? Recent developments in the
case law and their implication for one of the last sanctuaries of protectionism”, (2013) PPLR,
1–20, at 8 et seq.
324. Case C-160/08, Commission v. Germany, para 73 et seq.
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form adopted by the Member State.325 On the other hand, when assessing
whether official authority has been exercised, the Court is at times very
demanding.326 However it may be, this makes it necessary to distinguish
between authorizations and public contracts. The recent case law reads into
concessions an obligation for the beneficiary to pursue the activity
transferred.327 The same criterion has crept into Directive 2014/23. Under
Recital 14 thereof, acts such as authorizations or licences, whereby a public
authority thereof establishes “the conditions for the exercise of an economic
activity, including a condition to carry out a given operation granted, normally,
on request of the economic operator and not on the initiative of the contracting
authority or the contracting entity and where the economic operator remains
free to withdraw from the provision of works or services, should not qualify as
concessions.”
According to the same recital, “concession contracts provide for mutually
binding obligations where the execution of the works or services are subject to
specific requirements defined by the contracting authority or the contracting
entity, which are legally enforceable”. It is questionable whether this is really
relevant in distinguishing concession contracts from authorizations. The need
to differentiate between “a condition to carry out a given operation” from a
“mutually binding obligation” is sure to raise difficulties and increase
litigation, as contracting authorities may see in it an easy way to escape from
the rules of the public contracts directives. 328
It is submitted that the distinguishing element is again whether the
contracting authority has “acquired” or not, for itself or for the benefit of the
general public (or individual members thereof), some work, good or service.
This is what is really missing from “simple authorization schemes”.
Divergences in the definitions however resulted from the decision to have a
separate directive on concessions. As already remarked, “acquisition” is the
new added defining element of public procurement contracts. “Acquisition” is
not really part of the definition of concession under Directive 2014/23. This
cannot be explained away simply by recalling that in most service concessions
(but works concessions are already a different story) the service is rendered to
325. For discussion and references please refer to Caranta, op. cit. supra note 234, at 87 et
seq.
326. See again Case C-160/08, Commission v. Germany, para 73 et seq.
327. Case C-221/12,BelgacomNV , EU:C:2013:736, para 27; see critically on the reference
to “obligation” Caranta, op. cit. supra note 234, at 99 et seq., and, to a more limited extent, but
still referring to the possibility of abuses, Arrowsmith, op. cit. supra note 6, 393 et seq. and 596
et seq.
328. This may already be happening considering the cases analysed by Doherty, “The
United Kingdom” in Neergaard, Jacqueson and Ølykke, op. cit. supra note 234, at p. 769 et seq;
see also the discussion in Eleftheriadis, op. cit. supra note 243, at 53.
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the end users rather than to the contracting authority or entity. In service
procurements too, end users may be the beneficiary of the services procured
by the contracting authority or entity. In any case, the distinction between
procurement and concession does not depend on the final beneficiary of the
contract. It depends, as was shown, on the transfer of the exploitation risk.
Indeed, “acquisition” could well have been a defining element for concession,
as is shown by Recital 16 of Directive 2014/23, which indicates that
agreements that grant rights of way covering the utilization of public
immovable property for the provision or operation of fixed lines or networks
intended to provide a service to the public fall outside the scope of application
of the Directive “in so far as those agreements neither impose an obligation of
supply nor involve any acquisition of services by a contracting authority or
contracting entity to itself or to end users”. The latter test would alone be
enough to distinguish concessions from other legal acts, such as licences,
authorizations, but also “certain agreements having as their object the right of
an economic operator to exploit certain public domains or resources under
private or public law, such as land or any public property”.329
The notion of “acquisition” also easily distinguishes procurement and
concessions contracts from grants. The recitals to the directives feel the need
to underline that grants fall outside their scope of application even if there is
“an obligation to reimburse the amounts received where they are not used for
the purposes intended”. This is because of the fixation with “obligation” as a
defining element, but the point is quite simply that grants normally benefit the
recipient, while nothing is “acquired” by the contracting authority or entity.330
“Selectivity” is needed beside “acquisition” in order to define a public
procurement or concession contract. This is why arrangements where all
operators fulfilling certain conditions are entitled to perform a given task,
without any selectivity, such as for instance customer choice and service
voucher systems, fall outside the scope of application of the public contracts
directives. The economic operators actually providing the service to an end
user will indeed be chosen by the user him/herself rather than by the
contracting authority. The latter will simply act as a gatekeeper, allowing any
economic operator meeting the relevant requirements to be part of the
scheme.331 Otherwise the rules on framework agreements should be used by
analogy.
329. Rec. 15 of Dir. 2014/23.
330. Rec. 12 of Dir. 2014/23; Rec. 4 of Dir. 2014/24.
331. Rec. 13 of Dir. 2014/23; Rec. 4 of Dir. 2014/24; unfortunately the wording of the
recitals is somewhat different, the latter not mentioning “continuous access”; but there is no
reason why this requirement should not apply to the classic sector as well.
Public Contract Law 447
Selectivity may as well be present in some authorization schemes without
necessarily implying the application of public procurement rules in the
absence of any “acquisition” on the part of the contracting authority. This is
the case for instance with licences to operate gambling and betting
schemes.332 Directive 2006/123 on services in the internal market might rather
be the applicable law to the granting of some licences or authorizations.333 In
any case the general principles of the TFEU will normally apply to these
situations as well.334
4.6. Miscellaneous changes to or clarifications as to the scope of
application of the directives.
Directive 2007/66 amending the existing directives on remedies and Directive
2009/81 on procurements in the fields of defence and security while still in
force have been affected by the reform package. More specifically,Articles 46
and 47 of Directive 2014/23 have amended both Directive 89/665 and
Directive 92/13 (as already amended by Directive 2007/66), by changing the
references to the 2004 directives into references to the 2014 ones. The
applicability of the remedies directives to (most) service concessions has also
been specified.335 Articles 3 and 15–16 of Directive 2014/24 affect the scope
of application of the defence procurement Directive.336
4.7. Inroads in the implementation of contracts.
Just like international rules and documents on public contracts such as the
WTO Government Procurement Agreement or the UNICTRAL Model Law
on public procurement, EU law has traditionally focused on contract award.337
It is when choosing the contractor that domestic contracting authorities might
332. In this perspective, Rec. 35 of Dir. 2014/23 simply clarifies the legal position, without
adding anything to the rules.
333. See also Rec. 14 of Dir. 2014/23; on Dir. 2006/123/ EC; see the contributions in
Neergaard, Nielsen, and Roseberry op. cit. supra note 232, esp. at p. 65; see also Barnard,
“Unravelling the Services Directive”, 45 CML Rev. (2008), 323–394, 323.
334. Case C-470/11, Garkalns SIA, EU:C:2012:505, para 42 et seq; see Wollenschläger
op. cit. supra note 322, 416; see also Wollenschläger, Verteilungsverfahren: die staatliche
Verteilung knapper Güter: verfassungs- und unionsrechtlicher Rahmen, Verfahren im
Fachrecht, bereichsspezifische verwaltungsrechtliche Typen- und Systembildung (Mohr, 2010),
esp. p. 379 et seq., and Wolswinkel, De verdeling van schaarse publiekrechtelijke rechten. Op
zoek naar algemene regels van verdelingsrecht (Boom, 2013).
335. See Craven, op. cit. supra note 132, at 197.
336. See Trybus, op. cit. supra note 9, at 261 et seq.
337. See Caroli Casavola, “Global Rules for Public Procurement” in Noguellou and
Stelkens, op. cit. supra note 17, at p. 54 et seq.
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be tempted to discriminate against foreigners. The fight against buying
national practices is – as already mentioned – at the core of EU legislation in
this area. Contract implementation tends to be left to domestic law.338
Non-discrimination concerns may however spill over in the phase of the
implementation of the contract.339 More specifically, contracting authorities
may be tempted to change the scope of a contract to the benefit of a – usually
domestic – contractor or to prolong its duration, thus denying an opportunity
to other economic operators. Limits to the possibility to change the contract
without opening it again to competition were already laid down in the case
law.340 This is now comprehensively regulated in Article 72 of Directive
2014/24.341 Article 72 links with Article 73 which lists a number of situations
in which a contract must be terminated.342 Besides unlawful changes to the
contract, Article 73 lists award to a contractor which should have been
excluded under Article 57 and award following a serious breach of EU rules
declared in an infringement procedure. This complements ineffectiveness as
provided for in the remedies directives as redrafted by Directive 2007/66.343 It
compels Member States to have tools available which meet the requirements
laid down in a well-known infringement case against Germany, when the ECJ
ruled out the possibility to refer to sanctity of contract as an excuse to maintain
illegally awarded contracts until their expiration date.344
Concerns about possible discrimination against foreign economic operators
led to the regulation of contract performance clauses already in Directive
2004/18. Article 70 of the new Public Sector Directive basically reproduces
338. Trybus, op. cit. supra note 17, at 81 et seq.
339. See Comba, “Effects of EU law on contract management” in Trybus, Caranta and
Edelstam, op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 322 et seq.
340. Case C-454/06, Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur, EU:C:2008:351; Case C-91/08,Wall,
EU:C:2010:182.
341. See also Art. 43 of Dir. 2014/23 and Rec. 75 et seq. thereof; in-depth analysis in
Treumer, “Regulation of contract changes in the new public procurement Directive” in Lichère,
Caranta and Treumer, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 281 et seq., and in Treumer, “Contract changes
and the duty to retender under the new EU public procurement Directive”, (2014) PPLR, at 148
et seq.
342. See also Art. 44 of Dir. 2014/23 and Rec. 77 thereof.
343. Treumer, “Towards and obligation to terminate contracts concluded in breach of the
E.C. Public procurement rules – the end of the status of concluded public contract as sacred
cows”, (2007) PPLR, 371; Clifton “Ineffectiveness – the new deterrent: Will the new remedies
Directive ensure greater compliance with the substantive procurement in the classical sector?”,
(2009) PPLR, 167; cf. also Treumer, “Enforcement of the EU public procurement rules: The
state of law and current issues”, and Caranta, “Many different paths, but are they all leading to
effectiveness?” both in Treumer and Lichère, op. cit. supra note 8, at 32 et seq., and 77 et seq.
respectively.
344. Case C-503/04, Commission v. Germany.
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that provision, updated with a reference to innovation (and the insertion of the
requirement of a link to the subject matter of the contract to be understood in
the liberal way spelt out in Art. 67(3)).
What is really new is the regulation of subcontracting, to be found in
Article 71 of Directive 2014/24. The provision is quite complex but most of it
is in the nature of a framework spelling out what the Member States and the
contracting authorities may do (and might have done anyway and in some
cases were doing already).345 Indeed the views among the Member States and
within the EU institutions as to the protection of subcontractors were quite
polarized, a major issue being the legal base for provisions in this specific area
of public contract law.346 The provision is at its most binding in the first
paragraph, requiring the Member States to make sure that subcontractors
comply with the obligations in the fields of environmental, social and labour
law established by EU law, national law, collective agreements or by the
international environmental, social and labour law provisions referred to in
Article 18(2).347 As with this latter provision, on the one hand it is very much
left to the Member States to organize their services to achieve this aim; on the
other hand, the provision links with the specific rules on qualification recalled
in Article 71(5) and (6). The most contentious aspect was the possibility for
the contracting authority to pay subcontractors for their services directly.
Article 71(3) leaves entirely to the Member States any decision about this, so
that the situation is not really changed. For transparency reasons, this
possibility must be spelt out in the contract documents. One could question the
legal basis for a EU discipline of subcontracting, but Article 71 does not really
bind the Member States beyond what is already required by the rules on
qualification – which reflect equal treatment concerns – and transparency.
5. A different take on award procedures
Procedures are the life and soul of public procurement law and this is even
more so with reference to supranational regimes, as is made plain by the
traditional formula of Recital 1 of the Public Sector Directive. On the one
hand: “The award of public contracts by or on behalf of Member States’
authorities has to comply with the principles of the [TFEU]”. However, and
345. See Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, para 5.23 et seq; see also Comba, op. cit. supra note
339, at 326 et seq.
346. See also Trybus, op. cit. supra note 15, 278 et seq.
347. See Rec. 105; see also Art. 42(1) of Dir. 2014/23 and Rec. 72 thereof.
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this justifies EU legislation under the subsidiarity principle,348 for public
contracts above a certain value, “provisions should be drawn up coordinating
national procurement procedures so as to ensure that those principles are given
practical effect and public procurement is opened up to competition”. This is
echoed in the very first provision of the Public Sector Directive: Article 1(1)
reaffirms: “This Directive establishes rules on the procedures for procurement
by contracting authorities ….”
For award procedures, the starting point is that EU law has traditionally
been very nervous as to the use of negotiations in contract awards, worrying
about abusive conduct of the contracting authorities to steer the award
procedures in favour of domestic economic operators. While “in the
American procurement system, the negotiations are seen as creating a base for
competition and are therefore an optimizer of competition. The competition is
increased because of the negotiations. In the European system negotiations are
seen to limit, not optimize competition. The negotiated procedure is a
competitive procedure in spite of the negotiation not because of it”.349 Unlike
US legislation, EU law is based on the fear of preferential treatment for
domestic economic operators and discrimination against foreign ones.
Negotiated procedures are inherently more flexible, and as such they provide
greater opportunities for preferential treatment – if not for outright corruption
– for instance through selective distribution of information by the contracting
authority to the benefit of one economic operator.350 This time however the
EU law-makers were under much pressure from various stakeholders –
contracting authorities and some Member States, in particular – to introduce
more flexible procedures involving negotiations. As the Green Paper
preparing the reform recalled: “Contracting authorities sometimes complain
that the regulatory instruments provided by the EU rules are not fully adapted
to their purchasing needs. In particular, they claim that leaner and/or more
flexible procedures are needed”.351
One of the major innovations in the new Public Sector Directive is indeed
the competitive procedure with negotiation, which allows for negotiations in a
348. See COM(2011)896 final, at p. 6; this has not gone without contestation even before
the Directive was approved: see notably Arrowsmith, “The EC procurement directives, national
procurement policies and better governance”, 27 EL Rev. (2002), 3 et seq.
349. Steinicke, “Public procurement and the negotiated procedure – A lesson to learn from
U.S. Law?”, 8 ECLR (2011), at 331 et seq; see also Spagnolo, supra note 80, at 27.
350. The direct link between the discretion of contracting authorities and the risk of
corruption is however challenged, albeit with reference to award criteria, by Faustino,
“Regulating discretion in public procurement: An anti-corruption tool?” in Racca and Yukins,
op. cit. supra note 92, at p. 150 et seq.
351. COM(2011)15 final, at p. 12; as to the position of the Member States see e.g. the clear
view of Wijkman, “Major challenges for public procurement – A Swedish perspective”, in The
Cost of Different Goals…, cited supra note 4, at p. 123.
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way previously unheard of in EU public procurement law.352 Moreover, the
conditions allowing recourse to this procedure and to the competitive dialogue
were relaxed at the instance of the Council and the Member States therein,
especially when compared to those provided for under Article 29 of Directive
2004/18 with reference to the competitive dialogue.353 It may be too soon to
say whether these changes will be enough to assuage the concerns of
contracting authorities. Among the first reactions, some see the glass half full,
others half empty.354 Generally speaking, however, since contracting
authorities may today have recourse to these procedures in various vaguely
defined situations,355 it cannot be denied that we are faced with a “truly
remarkable widening of the scope of flexible tender procedures”.356 This in
turn required additional procedural safeguards to be added, for instance in
Article 29 of Directive 2014/24 regulating the competitive procedure with
negotiations.357 It may be doubted whether these safeguards will be enough to
keep a check on the openings for preferential treatment coming with more
flexible procedures.358
Considering that the grounds allowing recourse to the innovation
partnership, already referred to above, are stricter that those now applicable to
both the competitive dialogue and the competitive procedure with
negotiations, Article 26 of Directive 2014/24 now provides for two truly
general (or normal)359 award procedures (open and restricted), two procedures
which may be followed in many circumstances (competitive procedure with
negotiation and competitive dialogue), and two truly exceptional procedures
(innovation partnership and negotiated procedure without prior publication).
Another way to see it, which is probably belied by the way Article 26(1) is
drafted, would be to have the negotiated procedure without prior publication as
the only truly exceptional award procedure, since the innovation partnership
352. Telles and Butler, op. cit. supra note 83, 145 et seq; Davey, “Procedures involving
negotiation in the new Public Sector Directive: key reforms to the grounds for use and the
procedural rules”, (2014) PPLR, 103–111, 103; a parallel evolution has taken place in the
utilities sectors; however, the corresponding procedure laid down in Art. 47 of Dir. 2014/25 still
bears the old label of “negotiated procedure with prior call for competition”.
353. See Lichère, “Quid de la place nouvelle des procédures négociées et du dialogue
compétif?”, (2014) Bulletin Juridique des Contrats Publics, 166.
354. See for further references Caranta, op. cit. supra note 234, at 171 et seq.
355. See also the remarks by Tokár, op. cit. supra note 266, at 214 et seq.
356. Treumer, op. cit. supra note 3, 12 et seq; see also Davey, op. cit. supra note 352, at 104
et seq.; Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, para 3.7.
357. See also Rec. 45.
358. See Tokár, op. cit. supra note 266, at 216, also referring to the difficulty in monitoring
how negotiated procedures are actually managed.
359. Bovis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 92 et seq.
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both involves a call for competition and the conditions for its use are not really
very well defined. Indeed, a number of rules concerning both the competitive
procedure with negotiation and the competitive dialogue and the innovation
partnership are drafted in a very similar if not identical way.360 So, a
distinction is made between “standard”, “special” and “exceptional”
procedures. The open and restricted procedures which may be used in any
circumstance and for any type of contract are truly “standard”. Competitive
procedure with negotiation, competitive dialogue and innovation partnership
have a special nature because they can be chosen only according to specific
grounds for use. The negotiated procedure without prior publication is
exceptional because it is a final option for contracting authorities when
everything else fails.361
A different approach characterizes the Concession Directive, whose
procedural rules are quite basic.362 As usual, because of its detrimental effects
on competition, “the award of concessions without prior publication should
only be permitted in very exceptional circumstances”.363 However we do not
find here the usual panoply of different procedures to be used in different
circumstances. Article 31 of the Concessions Directive simply foresees that
“Contracting authorities and contracting entities wishing to award a
concession shall make known their intention by means of a concession notice”
drafted according to a specific model and published following the rules laid
down in Article 33. The procedural guarantees provided to the economic
operators mirror, at times in a more succinct form (e.g. Art. 36 on technical
and functional requirements) those provided generally under the classic sector
Procurement Directive. Under Article 39(1), limits for the receipt of
applications or of tenders should be set taking into account in particular the
complexity of the concession and the time required for drawing up tenders or
applications.
The light regime foreseen in the Concessions Directive is also particularly
evident with regard to award criteria.Article 41 of Directive 2014/23 is not just
simpler than the – admittedly overly complex – corresponding provisions
found in Articles 67 to 69 of Directive 2014/24. The point is that the
contracting authority or entity is granted more leeway than is the case under
the standard procurement regime. Under Article 41(3), it may exceptionally
change the order of the chosen and advertised criteria when faced with “a
tender which proposes an innovative solution with an exceptional level of
360. See also Lichère, op. cit. supra note 353, at 164 et seq.
361. Telles and Butler, op. cit. supra note 83, 132 et seq.
362. Referring to the proposal see Sanchez Graells, op. cit. supra note 21, at 96.
363. See Rec. 51; these circumstances are described in Art. 31(4) to (5).
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functional performance which could not have been foreseen”. This is,
admittedly, accompanied by safeguards for other tenderers or economic
operators. But it is something unheard of in EU public procurement
legislation.364
The shift of the regulatory preferences for award procedures is to raise
serious State aid issues.365 As is well known, an entire section of the
Commission Communication on the application of the EU State aids rules to
compensation granted for the provision of SGEI is devoted to the selection of
the provider.366 The starting point is that not every award procedure provided
for in the public contracts directives will satisfy State aid rules. Indeed “a
public procurement procedure only excludes the existence of State aid where
it allows for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing the service at
‘the least cost to the community’”.367 Procedures like competitive dialogue or
negotiated procedure with prior publication “confer a wide discretion upon
the adjudicating authority and may restrict the participation of interested
operators. Therefore, they can only be deemed sufficient to satisfy the fourth
Altmark criterion in exceptional cases”. Finally, the negotiated procedure
without publication of a contract notice is considered unsuitable to select a
tenderer capable of providing those services at “the least cost to the
community”.368
The new directives have changed the approach to award procedures
considerably, responding to a “great need” for contracting authorities to have
additional flexibility to choose a procurement procedure which provides for
negotiations.369 Or is this only apparent, with contracting authorities having
complied with the public contract directives still having to notify the award as
a State aid in very many – if not in most – cases? This is clearly unsatisfactory
but neither Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/23 nor Article 1(4) of Directive
364. The issue was discussed by Tvarnø, “Why the EU Public procurement Law should
contain rules that allow negotiation for public private partnerships’ in Ølykke, Risvig and
Tvarnø, op. cit. supra note 1, 210 et seq.
365. See Burnett, op. cit. supra note 10, 17.
366. O.J. 2012, C 8/02; see also for the discussion of the case law Bovis, op. cit. supra note
5, 482 et seq.
367. Point 65; specific and more elaborate guidance is provided by the Communication
from the Commission Framework for State aid for research and development and innovation –
COM(2014)3282.
368. Point 66.
369. See Treumer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 12 et seq. The different issues surrounding
negotiations in contract award procedures are analysed by Treumer, “Flexible procedures or
ban on negotiations? Will more negotiations limit the access to the procurement market?” and,
with reference to a specific procedure, by Tvarnø, “Why the EU public procurement law should
contain rules that allow negotiation for public private partnerships” both in Ølykke, Risvig and
Tvarnø, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 135 and 201 respectively.
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2014/24 do anything more than reaffirm the full rigour of State aid rules.370
Similar considerations apply to the structuring of award criteria, the public
contract directives being much less demanding than State aids rules.371
6. Conclusions and what remains to be done
One might be excused for having the impression that the reform of EU public
contract law has involved many more problems that solutions. It is not like
this. Important results in terms of flexibility, modernization, sustainability
have been achieved, which go beyond the specific provisions which it was
possible to analyse here.372
The new rules are however very complex. A certain degree of complexity is
unavoidable. Clear and simple rules will always be an elusive if not utopian
target.373 Finding partners in the internal market for the “Contracting State” is
a complex business, and even more so if sustainability and other strategic
objectives are to progress at the same time – for instance, as you cannot really
avoid provisions on life cycle costing if you take green procurement seriously.
Stricter rules are also the natural consequence of the “continuing attempts by
contracting authorities to escape from such rules as already exist”.374
Complexity may also be a function of flexibility. The obvious approach to
flexibility is to have basic rules allowing contracting authorities and entities
wide margins of discretion. Procedural safeguards are needed in this case. The
problem becomes that of deciding what are the minimal safeguards needed.
Concerns that flexibility will lead to abuse cannot, however, simply be
assuaged by new or strengthened rules on conflict of interest, fraud and
corruption even if the risks may be different in different jurisdictions.375
The Commission proposal for the Public Sector Directive understood
flexibility as an articulated toolbox of award procedures from which the
Member States could choose those best suited to their own internal situation.
This was good for both subsidiarity and flexibility – even if it would still have
made the directive quite long. The European Parliament however insisted on
370. See however, in a sense strengthening the specific merits of State aid rules, Sanchez
Graells, “Public procurement and State aid: Reopening the debate?”, (2012) PPLR, at 209 et
seq.
371. These concerns are not shared by Arrowsmith, op. cit. supra note 6, at 310 et seq.
372. See also Treumer, op. cit. supra note 3, 9 et seq.; Gormley, op. cit. supra note 135, 182.
373. A balanced assessment in Treumer, op. cit. supra note 3, 11.
374. Gormley, op. cit. supra note 135, 182.
375. And even if a link between discretion and corruption is well established: Bordalo
Faustino, “Regulating discretion in public procurement: An anti-corruption tool?” in Racca and
Yukins, op. cit. supra note 92, at p. 147 et seq.
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having the Member States implementing all procedures, the choices among
them thus now falling on the public purchasers. From another perspective,
flexibility required more negotiations. This, coupled with some reticence to
openly allow recourse to negotiation on a generalized basis, led to the very
complex system of procedures, as discussed.376
In the end, flexibility has entailed much complexity – but complexity goes
well beyond what could reasonably have been expected. The institutional
dynamics in the legislative process certainly made a major contribution to this
unsatisfactory outcome. The interpreter will pay the price for the necessity of
compromise and need “to have something for everyone and not to dissatisfy
people too much”.377 The lawmaker “appears frequently to have used the legal
technique ‘constructive ambiguity’ in order to strike compromises”.378 And
the interpreter is not helped by scores of rules ending up masquerading as
recitals.379
Overly complex and at times obscure rules should not be accepted as an
inevitable consequence of a more democratic Union where the Parliament
finally makes its voice heard. It is suggested that other aspects deserve
consideration as well. One major issue seems to be – and academic bias is
hereby acknowledged – a still somewhat weak intellectual structure of EU
public contract law. Some key concepts such as public contract and public
procurement have not yet been properly refined at EU level. The Green paper
on The modernization of EU public procurement policy – Towards a more
efficient European Procurement Market called on the EU institutions to do
precisely this claiming that “the review of the legislative framework will also
be an opportunity to examine if certain basic notions and concepts should be
refined to ensure better legal certainty for contracting authorities and
undertakings”.380 Again, not enough has been done.381 As shown in a number
of examples, the case law does not always provide clear indications. This
situation can easily lead to misunderstandings. Contracting authorities and
domestic courts will tend to read these concepts on the familiar lines of the
national culture, which translates into diverging applications and in some
cases misapplications of EU law. The ReNEUAL project is presently
addressing the need for a common understanding of different parts of EU
376. Supra section 5.
377. Gormley, op. cit. supra note 135, 173.
378. Treumer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 21; see also at 23 et seq. for some instances.
379. Treumer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 10, quite rightly laments “The unfortunate tendency
to regulate in the Preamble instead of in the substantive provisions . . . deliberately unclear
provisions inserted in order to reach a compromise”; see also ibid. 21 et seq. That recitals are
indeed relevant is shown by the cases recalled by Gormley, op. cit. supra note 135, 173.
380. COM(2011)15 final, at p. 5.
381. See also Caranta, op. cit. supra note 188, at 86 et seq.
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administrative law, including public contracts,382 but it is submitted that more
should be done when new legislation is prepared to provide a coherent system
of EU law autonomous concepts in these (and other) areas of the law.383
Reference to coherence inevitably leads to the additional issue of how the
rules for different policy areas or partitions of EU law are actually
coordinated. The Green paper went on to claim that “the review may present
certain opportunities to increase convergence between the application of the
EU public procurement and State aid rules”.384 As already remarked, the
reform has utterly failed in enhancing convergence. Rather it has widened
divergence.
The next question is what remains to be done. The Commission is expected
to lead in the implementation of the new directives even before policing their
application by and in the Member States. One obvious instance is life cycle
costing methodologies. As already remarked, Article 68 of Directive 2014/24
very much treads a thin line between empowering contracting authorities to
develop such methodologies and worrying that this could be done to favour
certain economic operators.385 The obvious solution is to develop objectively
verifiable, non-discriminatory, accessible and reasonably burdensome criteria
at EU level. Recital 95 calls on the Commission to develop further life cycle
methodologies and this is obviously necessary and urgent.386
The burden of implementing the directives will of course fall on the
Member States, who are in principle given until 18 April 2016 (and longer
times concerning mandatory use of electronic means).An important feature of
the new directives, which makes them more flexible instruments than they
used to be, is the room for choice the Member States are often left with. While
this was already the case with the 2004 directives, allowing discretion to the
Member States has reached a new climax with the 2014 reform. A good
example is Article 18(2) of Directive 2014/24 which asks Member States to
take appropriate measures to ensure the compliance with obligations in the
fields of environmental, social and labour law and so on.387 Similarly under
Article 24 of the same Directive it is up to the Member States to make sure that
effective measures are taken to tackle conflicts of interest.388
382. <www.reneual.eu> (last visited 22 Nov. 2014)
383. For some suggestions, see Caranta, “Les exigences systémiques dans le droit
administratif de l’Unione européenne” in Blumann and Picod (Eds.), Annuaire de Droit de
l’Union Européenne 2012 (Editions Panthéon Assas, 2014), p. 21.
384. COM(2011)15 final, at p. 5.
385. See Semple, op. cit. supra note 36, para 4.46 et seq.
386. Dragos and Neamtu, op. cit. supra note 34, 336 et seq.
387. See also Art. 30(3) of Dir. 2014/23 and Rec. 55 thereof.
388. See also Art. 35 of Dir. 2014/23 and Rec. 61 thereof.
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In a way those provisions lead us back to the traditional idea of the directive
as an instrument binding as to the result to be achieved but leaving to the
national authorities the choice of form and methods.389 This very old but still
somewhat novel approach reaches its climax with the light regime of the
Concession Directive.390 More often than not the Member States are even free
to decide whether or not to have some provisions incorporated in their
domestic legislation. For instance under Article 20 of Directive 2014/24 they
may choose to reserve the award of some contracts to sheltered workshops
and other specific economic operators; under Article 36(1) they may render
the use of electronic catalogues mandatory in connection with certain types of
procurement; under Article 37(1) they may provide that contracting
authorities may acquire supplies and/or services from a central purchasing
body; under Article 46(3) they may provide that, where more than one lot may
be awarded to the same tenderer, contracting authorities may award contracts
combining several or all lots. As it shown by that last example, leaving the
matter to be decided at national level was a way out of impasses in the
legislative process. Other good instances are provided by the mostly elective
discipline of subcontracting and by the last indent of Article 67(2), leaving to
the Member States to rule out recourse to price only or cost only as the sole
award criterion or to restrict their use to certain categories of contracting
authorities or certain types of contracts. Among the many provisions on
sustainable procurement only the obligation to reject abnormally low tender
where this is due to the non-compliance with environmental or social rule is
binding on the Member States. Running somewhat against this tendency is the
decision to take away from the Member States the freedom left them under
Directive 2004/18 whether or not to regulate some award procedures, as all of
them now have to be implemented in domestic law, and the decision to make
compulsory some aspects of e-procurement.391
The Member States will ultimately have to make a number of choices
appropriate to their social situations and political preferences.392 One can
expect deeply different approaches, which will perpetuate if not even
reinforce the significant divergence in public contract law and practice in the
Member States (albeit reduced when compared to say twenty years ago). The
status of the public contract directives as a “notable example of codification of
supranational administrative law” has not been much strengthened in this
389. See Arrowsmith, op. cit. supra note 6, 174, recalling that the directives should simply
provide a framework for domestic legislation.
390. See supra section 4.1.
391. On the first aspect, see critically Arrowsmith, op. cit. supra note 6, 612 et seq.
392. For a less rosy take, see Arrowsmith, op. cit. supra note 6, 177.
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reform round.393 The domestic traditions remain still strong in this area, and
path dependency is deemed to perpetuate some measure of difference.394
The issue will be whether the choices made in this or that Member State will
be sufficient to make sure that the aims of the directives – and more generally
of EU public contract law – are achieved. As it has been rightly remarked
leaving the Member States a wide discretion as to how these principles should
be interpreted at national level has the obvious disadvantage to “lead to
significant variations in the level of protection in the Member States”.395
393. The reference applied to the 2004 round: see Bovis, op. cit. supra note 5, 494.
394. This is evident from the reports collected in Neergaard, Jacqueson and Ølykke, op. cit.
supra note 234.
395. Treumer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 11.
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